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I. Introduction: 
Islamic finance is the only example of a financial system directly based on the ethical precepts 
of a major religion, providing not only investment guidelines but also a set of unique 
investment and financing products.” Islamic finance is based on Shari'a, the Islamic law that 
provides guidelines for multiple aspects of Muslim life, including religion, politics, 
economics, banking, business and aspects of the legal system What  shari‘a  compliant 
financing (SCF) seeks to do is to shape financial practices and accompanying legal 
instruments that conform to Islamic law. Major financial principles of  shari‘a  include a ban 
on interest, a ban on uncertainty, adherence to risk-sharing and profit-sharing, promotion of 
ethical investments that enhance society and do not violate practices banned in the Qur’an 
and tangible asset-backing. 
Money, according to Islamic teachings is a measure of value, not a commodity. Debt is a 
relationship in which risk and responsibility are shared by all parties to a contract. Money 
must be put to practical use in creating real value for the participants of the transaction. It 
must be used to create, and not be a commodity in on and of itself. It because of this that the 
perception of hoarding capital, and the earning of a passive return on capital keyed to the 
passage of time, -i.e. interest – is prohibited. In short, money must not be made from money. 
The establishment of modern Islamic financial institutions started three decades ago. 
Currently, there are at least 70 countries that have some form of Islamic financial services; 
almost all major multinational banks are offering these services. 
Two developments have been critical to the expansion of Islamic financial markets. In 1998, 
the so-called “Dow Jones Islamic Indexes fatwa” played a transformative role because it 
opened the door to a limited degree of “permissible impurity” in financial transactions and 
institutionalized a notion of cleansing and purification whereby small amounts of 
impermissible interest income could be cleansed or purified by donation to charity. In turn, 
this led to a series of equity investment tests that could be used to evaluate potential 
investments for  shari‘a  compliance. 
A second critical innovation was the introduction of sukuk – a  shari‘a  compliant substitute 
for bonds – where capital protection is achieved not as a loan but as a binding agreement by 
the issuer to repurchase certain assets over a period of time. 
Sukuk has now become one of the backbones of Islamic capital markets and has enabled the 
rapid growth of Islamic financial transactions. 
While the Islamic finance industry represents a fraction of the global finance market, it has 
grown at double-digit rates in recent years. By some estimates, total assets held globally under 
Islamic finance reached $1 trillion in 2010. Islamic banks have appeared to be more resilient 
than conventional banks to the immediate effects of the international financial crisis and 
global economic downturn. Some analysts have attributed this to Islamic banks’ avoidance 
of 
speculative activities. However, the Islamic finance industry has not been completely immune 
to the general decline in demand and investor uncertainty. Global issuance of Islamic capital 
market securities (sukuk), a fast-growing segment of the Islamic finance industry, peaked in 
2007 at $35 billion, declined to $15 billion in 2008 and then rose to $20 billion in 2009. 
 
The multiple reasons for the growth of the Islamic financial sector in recent years:  
(1) The flow of funds into Muslim oil-producing states; 
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(2) Growing political and social desire in the Muslim world for financial alternatives to 
banking and investment institutions that have been historically dominated by the 
West;  
(3) The spreading credit crisis in global financial markets and the need to access new 
sources of investment capital; 
(4) The growth of sovereign wealth funds and the desire to have  shari‘a  compliant 
instruments through which to invest them; and,  
(5) The rapidly accelerating number of cross-border multi-jurisdictional financial 
transactions that are possible and required in a globalized world economy Assets held 
by Muslim investors worldwide now exceed $1.6 trillion, and that amount is expected 
to grow to $2.7 trillion by 2010.  
 shari‘a  compliant finance has become an accepted and vibrant element in international 
financial transactions. It offers a fresh opportunity to emphasize the moral and ethical 
aspects of business and finance that reaches beyond the Arab and Islamic worlds to 
prompt a reexamination of the core values underlying all global financial transactions – 
making available the financial resources needed to develop the human capital that will 
sustain economic and social progress. The main principles of Islamic finance include: 
(1) The prohibition of taking or receiving interest; 
(2) Capital must have a social and ethical purpose beyond pure,unfettered return; 
(3) Investments in businesses dealing with alcohol, gambling, drugs or anything else that 
the  shari‘a  considers unlawful are deemed undesirable and prohibited; 
(4) A prohibition on transactions involving maysir (speculation or gambling); and 
(5) A prohibition on gharar, or uncertainty about the subject-matter and terms of contracts 
– this includes a prohibition on selling something that one does not own. 
Because of the restriction on interest-earning investments, Islamic banks must obtain their 
earnings through profit-sharing investments or fee-based returns. When loans are given for 
business purposes, the lender, if he wants to make a legitimate gain under the  shari‘a , should 
take part in the risk. If a lender does not take part in the risk, his receipt of any gain over the 
amount loaned is classed as interest. Islamic financial institutions also have the flexibility to 
engage in leasing transactions, including leasing transactions with purchase options. 
It may be asked why non-Muslims would agree to use Islamic finance structures. The 
principal answer is that Islamic finance provides an opportunity to tap into the significant 
funds of Islamic investors seeking  shari‘a  compliant investments. In addition, Islamic 
finance can be combined with conventional funding sources and export credit agency (ECA) 
support. 
Good governance is crucial to the ability of a business to protect the interests of its 
stakeholders. These interests may extend beyond the purely financial to the 
stakeholders’ ethical, religious, or other values. In the case of an institution offering 
Islamic financial services, stakeholders expect its operations to be carried out in 
compliance with the principles of shari‘a  (Islamic Law). A corporate structure that 
enables such an institution to implement good governance through shari‘a -compliant 
operations is therefore essential. 
 
As the Islamic finance industry develops further, there is a growing need for 
standardisation and professionalism across the industry. Coupled with this is the 
importance of adopting robust corporate governance systems of internationally 
recognised standards incorporating transparent, fair and ethical working practices. 
Islamic financial institutions are well-placed in this context, since at the heart of 
Islamic law is a vision of social development which requires all individuals and 
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businesses to conduct themselves ethically and in a socially responsible manner. The 
Guiding Principles demonstrate how closely aligned are the basic principles of 
corporate governance with shari‘a  rules and doctrines, and consequently how IFIs are 
well-placed to offer shareholders opportunities to participate in a broader goal of 
corporate social responsibility. 
The design of a corporate governance system in Islamic economic system entails 
implementation of a rule-based incentive system such that the compliance with the 
rules ensures an efficient governance system to preserve social justice and 
order among all members of society. This would imply the design of institutions and 
rules that induce or, if needed, compel managers to internalize the welfare of all 
stakeholders. The rights that are claimed for stakeholders are not ends in themselves-- 
which ought to be recognized in any form of economic organization--but means for 
protecting constituency rights. In an Islamic system the observance of rules of behavior 
guarantees internationalization of stakeholder rights (including those of the society at 
large). No other institutional structure would be needed if there were complete 
adherence to Islamic rules. However, to ensure compliance to the Islamic rules, there 
is need for institutional arrangements. Therefore, it would be the Islamic government 
that should specify appropriate corporate governance structure, “incorporating all 
stakeholders’ rights into fiduciary duties of managers” of the firm on behalf of none-- 
investors or stakeholders. So no other institutional arrangement that would allow 
individual non-investor stakeholders to negotiate directly with the firm would be 
necessary. Incorporating all stakeholders’ right into fiduciary duties of managers 
would be counter-productive and would lead to suboptimal results. The important point 
is that each stakeholder is given freedom of bargaining to protect its rights and there 
are systematic institutional arrangements in place to provide protection and to mediate 
where disputes and disagreements arise. 
Institutional arrangements can be part of system-wide infrastructure surrounding the 
governance structure of the firm. For example, because contracts are invariably 
incomplete, judicial interpretations can fill in the gaps. It is permissible to regard 
employment law, consumer law, tort law, as well as judicial rulings and administrative 
regulations, as part of the contracts that various stakeholders have with the firm. 
Similarly, the concept of shari‘a  boards is very unique to Islamic financial system. A 
shari‘a  board, consisting of fuqaha’ (scholars in shari‘a  matters) has been used to 
oversea the operation of a financial institution to ensure that the operations and code 
of conduct of Islamic bank is according to the rules of shari‘a . A shari‘a  board for 
every firm, which is seen in present architecture of Islamic banking, is not efficient 
whereas only one set of rules is needed for appropriate corporate governance based on 
the shari‘a  for all firms. The same idea of shari‘a  board can be extended to a system-
level board consisting of scholars from different disciplines including shari‘a , 
economics, finance, and commercial law, to ensure that rules are defined and enforced 
so that economic agents fully comply with contractual obligations to all the 
stakeholders. 
This book reviews IIFS’ corporate governance (CG) challenges and suggests options 
to address them. Four main concerns motivate this attention to the CG of IIFS: 
(1) CG is important for economic development; (2) the assets of IIFS are 
significant and growing, (3) sound CG may be more critical for financial than 
other organizations, and (4) the CG vulnerabilities of IIFS may not have received 
adequate attention in conventional CG frameworks. 
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This book is one of few papers that highlight the importance of studying 
corporate governance for institutions offering Islamic financial services. The 
book is of value in describing governance in Islamic institutions and how there 
are many issues under the investigation process, especially issues related to the 
shari‘a  Supervisory board and its functionality. 
One of the objectives of this paper is to discuss, and create greater awareness of, 
some of the crucial issues related to corporate governance in Islamic financial 
institutions. A second, but in fact more important, objective is to provide, in the 
light of this discussion, certain essential guidelines to improve corporate 
governance in these institutions and thereby enable them to not only maintain 
their momentum of growth and international acceptance but also safeguard the 
interests of all stakeholders. The paper gives particular attention to the 
mechanisms for corporate governance, including the Board of Directors, Senior 
Management, shareholders, depositors, and regulatory and supervisory 
authorities. It also focuses on the effective management of risks and, in particular, 
on creating a supporting environment through moral uplift, social, legal and 
institutional checks, greater transparency, internal controls, and Sharī‘ah as well 
as external audit. The paper also indicates briefly the shared institutions that are 
needed for effective corporate governance. 
 
 
 
II. Fundamentals of the Islamic finance 
 
One of the most important objectives of Islam is to realize greater justice in human society. 
According to the Qur’an all the messengers of God were sent to promote justice and any 
society where there is no justice will ultimately head towards decline and destruction. One of 
the essential requisites for ensuring justice is a set of rules or moral values, which everyone 
accepts and complies with faithfully. The financial system may be able to promote justice if, 
in addition to being strong and stable, it satisfies at least two conditions. One of these is that 
the financier should also share in the risk so as not to shift the entire burden of losses to the 
entrepreneur or the borrower, and the other is that an equitable share of the society’s financial 
resources becomes available to even the poor on affordable terms in keeping with their ability 
to repay so as to enable them to realize their dream of owning their own homes, pursuing 
higher education and vocational training, and establishing their own micro enterprises. 
To fulfill the first condition of justice, Islam requires both the financier and the entrepreneur 
to equitably share the profit as well as the loss. For this purpose, one of the basic principles 
of Islamic finance is: “No risk, no gain.” This should help introduce greater discipline into 
the financial system by motivating financial institutions to assess the risks more carefully and 
to effectively monitor the use of funds by borrowers. The double assessment of risks by both 
the financier and the entrepreneur should help inject greater discipline into the system, and 
go a long way in not only increasing efficiency in the use of resources but also reducing 
excessive lending. 
Islamic finance is based on  shari‘a , an Arabic term that is often translated into “Islamic law”.  
shari‘a  provides guidelines for aspects of Muslim life, including religion, politics, economics, 
banking, business, and law.  shari‘a -compliant financing (SCF) constitutes financial practices 
that conform to Islamic law. 
Islamic finance was practiced predominantly in the Muslim world throughout the Middle 
Ages, fostering trade and business activities with the development of credit. In Spain and the 
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Mediterranean and Baltic states, Islamic merchants became indispensable middlemen for 
trading activities. In fact, many concepts, techniques, and instruments of Islamic finance were 
later adopted by European financiers and businessmen. 
In contrast, the term “Islamic financial system” is relatively new, appearing only in the mid-
1980s. In fact, all the earlier references to commercial or mercantile activities conforming to 
Islamic principles were made under the umbrella of either “interest free” or “Islamic” 
banking. However, describing the Islamic financial system simply as “interest-free” does not 
provide a true picture of the system as a whole. Undoubtedly, prohibiting the receipt and 
payment of interest is the nucleus of the system, but it is supported by other principles of 
Islamic doctrine advocating risk sharing, individuals’ rights and duties, property rights, and 
the sanctity of contracts. 
Similarly, the Islamic financial system is not limited to banking but covers capital formation, 
capital markets, and all types of financial intermediation. Interpreting the system as “interest 
free” tends to create confusion. The philosophical foundation of an Islamic financial system 
goes beyond the interaction of factors of production and economic behavior. Whereas the 
conventional financial system focuses primarily on the economic and financial aspects of 
transactions, the Islamic system places equal emphasis on the ethical, moral, social, and 
religious dimensions, to enhance equality and fairness for the good of society as a whole. The 
system can be fully appreciated only in the context of Islam’s teachings on the work ethic, 
wealth distribution, social and economic justice, and the role of the state. 
The Islamic financial system is founded on the absolute prohibition of the payment or receipt 
of any predetermined, guaranteed rate of return. This closes the door to the concept of interest 
and precludes the use of debt-based instruments. The system encourages risk-sharing, 
promotes entrepreneurship, discourages speculative behavior, and emphasizes the sanctity of 
contracts. Modern Islamic finance has existed internationally since the 1970s. Currently, 
Islamic finance represents a small but growing segment of the global finance industry. In 
some countries, such as Iran and Pakistan, Islamic banks are the only mainstream financial 
institutions. In others,  shari‘a -compliant financing (SCF)  exists alongside conventional 
banking. Estimates vary of the total size of assets held internationally under Islamic finance, 
generally ranging from $800 billion to $1 trillion, with growth rates of 10% to 15% annually 
over the past ten years. The Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia historically have been and 
continue to be the major centers for SCF. For oil producers in the Gulf region, Islamic finance 
may offer investment opportunities for their growing revenues from oil exports. There also 
has been a growing awareness of and demand for Islamic-based financial products by Muslim 
consumers. In 2007, Iran was the largest market for Islamic finance, reportedly accounting 
for close to 40% of  shari‘a -compliant financial assets worldwide.6 However, according to 
some analysts, the reach of Iran’s Islamic finance market may be limited because of 
international sanctions. Following Iran, the largest Islamic finance markets in 2007 were 
Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Support for Islamic 
finance varies in the Middle East. In some countries, such as Libya and Morocco, Islamic 
banks are considered by some to be tied to Islamic political parties and consequently have 
been refused licenses. Other countries, including Jordan, Tunisia, and the Sudan, have been 
receptive to Islamic finance, viewing Islamic financial products as an opportunity for creating 
capital and fostering economic development. 
In recent years, SCF has expanded to other parts of the world. Islamic finance is growing in 
Europe and North America, areas in which Muslims are in the minority. In August 2004, the 
United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority (FSA) approved a banking license for the 
Islamic Bank of Britain (IBB), the country’s first Islamic bank. The IBB would serve the 
consumer market with  shari‘a -compliant products. In March 2006, the FSA licensed the 
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European Islamic Investment Bank as the United Kingdom’s first independent bank for  
shari‘a -compliant investments. In 1999, the Dow Jones presented its first Islamic market 
index, which follows  shari‘a -compliant stocks internationally. The Dow Jones maintains 
more than 70 indices in its Islamic series and is advised by an independent  shari‘a  
Supervisory Board counsel. 
A.  shari‘a  law defined 
 
 shari‘a  (or Islamic) law is meant to regulate all aspects of a Muslim's way of life. It is 
broadly divided into two sets of rules: one relates to the obligatory worship of God (ibadah) 
and the other relates to daily life outside the context of obligatory worship (muamalat), 
including commercial and financial dealings.  shari‘a  is not a codified body of law. It consists 
of general rules and principles derived from the Qur'an (the Muslim holy book), the practices 
(sunnah) and sayings (ahadith) of the Prophet Mohammed (as discussed in further detail 
below). These general principles are capable of interpretation and development to address 
new issues or circumstances that arise from time to time. Indeed, the  shari‘a  has been 
supplemented by extensive Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) developed over centuries by different 
schools of thought (the madhaa'hib). The key point to note is that, while all the schools of 
thought agree on the fundamental  shari‘a  principles enshrined in the Qur'an, sunnah and 
hadith, they sometimes hold differing views on their interpretation and application. 
B. Sources of  shari‘a  law 
 
 shari‘a  law is derived from a number of primary and secondary sources. 
1. Qur'an 
The Qur'an is a primary source of law and is believed by Muslims to contain the word of God 
as revealed to the Prophet Mohammed. Evidence found in other sources of  shari‘a  law is 
subject to the Qur'an. 
2. Sunnah 
Sunnah literally means "well known path". The Sunnah is a primary source of law and 
comprises traditional accounts of what the Prophet Mohammed said or did during his life 
Which have legal content. Sunnah also comprises the sayings of others tacitly approved by 
the Prophet's silence. 
3. Hadith 
A further primary source of law is the narrative record of sayings and actions of the Prophet 
Mohammed known as hadith (plural ahadith). The extent to which sunnah is derived or 
differentiated from ahadith depends on the context and school of thought being considered. 
4. Qiyas 
Qiyas represents the process of reasoning whereby the principles found in the Qur'an and 
sunnah are extended to new cases by analogy. 
5. Ijma 
Ijma represents the consensus of the Islamic community (whether at a local or global 
academic level) on a particular issue. 
6. Ijtihad 
Ijtihad is the interpretation and the opinion of Islamic jurists on a particular issue. Qiyas,ijma 
and ijtihad are all secondary sources of  shari‘a  law. 
C. Issues relating to interpretation and application of  shari‘a  law 
 
Since  shari‘a  law is not a single codified body of law and is open to interpretation, the 
opinions of  shari‘a  scholars may differ on the same question of  shari‘a  law depending on 
the school of thought to which particular scholars belong. In addition, scholars' views on 
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questions of  shari‘a  law may change over time. This can lead to uncertainty and 
inconsistency of interpretation and application of  shari‘a  law across the Islamic world. 
1. Key  shari‘a  principles and prohibitions relevant to finance  
There are a number of key  shari‘a  principles and prohibitions relevant to finance and 
commercial transactions which distinguish Islamic finance from the conventional forms. For 
completeness, it should be mentioned that there are two main branches within Islam: sunnism 
and shiaism. The majority of Muslims are sunni and the following is limited to the discussion 
of the general  shari‘a  principles relating to Islamic finance within sunni jurisprudence. The 
key  shari‘a  principles which underpin Islamic finance, and have led to the creation of a 
separate finance industry, are as follows: 
a) Prohibition on usury and interest (riba) 
Prohibition of interest. Prohibition of riba, a term literally meaning “an excess” and 
interpreted as “any unjustifiable increase of capital whether in loans or sales” is the central 
tenet of the system. More precisely, any positive, fixed, predetermined rate tied to the 
maturity and the amount of principal (i.e., guaranteed regardless of the performance of the 
investment) is considered riba and is prohibited. The general consensus among Islamic 
scholars is that riba covers not only 
Usury but also the charging of “interest” as widely practiced. 
This prohibition is based on arguments of social justice, equality, and property rights. Islam 
encourages the earning of profits but forbids the charging of interest because profits, 
determined ex post, symbolize successful entrepreneurship and creation of additional wealth 
whereas interest, determined ex ante, is a cost that is accrued irrespective of the outcome of 
business operations and may not create wealth if there are business losses. Social justice 
demands that borrowers and lenders share rewards as well as losses in an equitable fashion 
and that the process of wealth accumulation and distribution in the economy be fair and 
representative of true productivity. 
Under the  shari‘a , it is not permissible to charge, pay or receive interest. The  shari‘a  does 
not recognize the time value of money and it is therefore not permissible to make money by 
lending it. Money must be used to create real economic value and it is only permissible to 
earn a return from investing money in permissible commercial activities which involve the 
financier or investor taking some commercial risk. This prohibition is the main driving force 
behind the development of the modern Islamic finance industry. Riba can take one of two 
forms: riba al-naseeyah and riba al-fadl. 
1- Riba al-naseeyah is the amount of excess received by a lender in addition to the capital 
amount lent. This type of riba is comparable to the traditional concept of interest in 
conventional lending 
activities. 
2- The second type, riba al-fadl, is excess compensation without any form of consideration 
in return. 
In modern finance, riba al-fadl could be applicable to several exchange of commodities 
contracts. 
The idea is that when compensation is paid, it should be justified or be set against a specific 
activity and the return should also be associated with a specific risk. Therefore when parties 
exchange commodities of similar value and one party pays excessive compensation to the 
other party, this is 
Considered riba. 
b) Prohibition on realising a gain from speculation (mayseer) 
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It is not permissible to earn a profit from speculation. Gambling is therefore not permitted 
under  shari‘a . Any contracts or arrangements which involve speculation are also not 
permitted. That said, it is accepted under the  shari‘a  that there is an element of speculation 
in most commercial arrangements and, unlike the absolute prohibition of interest, it is a 
question of the degree of speculation involved and whether the intention behind the 
transaction is to realise a gain from some productive effort or purely speculation. 
The distinction between prohibited speculation and legitimate commercial speculation is not 
always clear in practice and there are examples where it can be difficult to distinguish between 
the two. For example, it is generally accepted that it is permissible to make an equity 
investment in a company 
Engaging in a business activity that is permissible under the  shari‘a  with a view to realising 
future dividends and capital gains on the investment. There is of course a degree of 
commercial speculation involved about the future prospects of the company when an investor 
makes an equity investment, but whether such speculation is permissible or not would depend 
on the intention of the investor, i.e. was the intention to make a quick profit by speculating in 
the likely movement of the share price over a very short period of time (as is arguably the 
case with day trading), or was the decision made on the basis of careful evaluation of the 
company's past results and future prospects? 
At the other end of the spectrum, equity derivatives such as index-linked derivatives are 
generally viewed as unacceptable under  shari‘a  because they involve speculation on the 
movement of an equity index. 
c) No uncertainty (gharar) in commercial transactions 
 
Certainty of terms in any transaction is a key requirement under the  shari‘a . Again, as with 
speculation, a degree of commercial uncertainty is acceptable but there must not be any 
uncertainty about the key terms of the transaction. For example, in a transaction for the sale 
of assets, the sale contract should set out a clear description of the assets being sold, the sale 
price and the time for delivering the assets to the purchaser. Similarly, a leasing contract needs 
to set out clearly the assets which are being leased, the duration of the lease and the rent 
payable under the lease. One of the reasons that conventional insurance contracts are not 
considered permissible under the  shari‘a  is that there is no certainty as to when a claim will 
be paid, given that there is no way of knowing if and when the insured event will occur. 
In the context of modern day Islamic finance, key examples of gharar are: 
(a) Advising a customer to buy shares of a particular company that is the subject of a takeover 
bid, on the grounds that its share price can be expected to rise; 
(b) Buying a house, the price of which is to be specified in the future; 
(c) When the subject matter or specifications to a contract are unknown; and  
(d) Deferred payment under a contract where the deferment is for an unknown period. 
d) All activity must be for permitted purposes (halal) 
 
Muslims must not engage in (or derive any benefit from) activities which are prohibited under 
the  shari‘a . It is therefore not permissible for Muslims to invest in businesses which engage 
in prohibited activities such as casinos, a breweries or a factories making pork products. It is 
also not permissible for Islamic banks to provide any financing to such businesses. However, 
a very strict interpretation of these rules would mean that Muslims would only be able to 
invest in a very limited number of businesses internationally. For example, it would not be 
permissible for Muslims to invest in a hotel that serve alcohol, a food company which also 
manufactures pork products as part of its product range or any business that lends or borrows 
money at interest. 
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In light of the practical considerations of international commerce and in order to enable 
Muslim investors to participate in it, a number of prominent  shari‘a  scholars have advanced 
the view that it is permissible for Muslims to invest in businesses or companies which are not 
entirely  shari‘a  compliant so long as certain conditions are met. These conditions include 
(among other things): 
(a) The principal business activity must be permissible under  shari‘a ; 
(b) Any income derived from prohibited activities should only form a small percentage of the 
overall income of the company or business (this percentage ranges from 5 to 20 per cent. Of 
overall income depending upon the nature of the prohibited activity and the  shari‘a  scholars 
involved); 
(c) The aggregate amount of interest-bearing debt incurred by a company or business must 
not exceed a certain percentage of its assets or market capitalisation (there are disagreements 
between  shari‘a  scholars as to what percentage is acceptable and it ranges from 25 to 35 per 
cent. of total assets or market capitalisation depending upon the scholars involved); and  
(d) The accounts receivable of the company on the business must not exceed a certain 
percentage of its assets or market capitalisation (usually set between 25 and 33 per cent.). 
e) Making Money from Money is not Permissible 
One of the wrong presumptions on which all theories of interest are based is that money is a 
commodity. It is, therefore, argued that just as a merchant can sell his commodity for a higher 
price than his cost, he can also sell his money for a higher price than its face value, or just as 
he can lease his property and can charge a rent against it, he can also lend his money and can 
claim interest thereupon. Islamic principles, however, do not subscribe to this presumption. 
Money and commodity have different characteristics and, therefore, they are treated 
differently. 
The basic points of difference between money and commodity:- 
(a) Money has no intrinsic utility. It cannot be utilized in direct fulfillment of human needs. 
It can only be used for acquiring some goods or services. A commodity, on the other hand, 
has intrinsic utility and can be utilized directly without exchanging it for some other thing. 
(b) Commodities can be of different qualities while money has no quality except that it is a 
measure of value or a medium of exchange. Therefore, all the units of money of the same 
denomination, are hundred per cent equal to each other. An old and dirty note of SR.100 has 
the same value as a brand new note of SR.100. 
(c) In commodities, the transactions of sale and purchase are effected on an identified 
particular commodity. If A has purchased a particular car by pinpointing it, and seller has 
agreed, he deserves to receive the same car. The seller cannot compel him to take the delivery 
of another car, though of the same type or quality. Money, on the contrary, cannot be 
pinpointed in a transaction of exchange. If A has purchased a commodity from B by showing 
him a particular note of 100 SR.100 he can still pay him another note of the same 
denomination. 
Based on these basic differences, Islamic  shari‘a  has treated money differently from 
commodities, especially on two scores: 
Firstly, money (of the same denomination) is not held to be the subject matter of trade, like 
other commodities. Its use has been restricted to its basic purpose i.e. to act as a medium of 
exchange and a measure of value. Secondly, if for exceptional reasons, money has to be 
exchanged for money or it is borrowed, the payment on both sides must be equal, so that it is 
not used for the purpose it is not meant for i.e. trade in money itself. In short, money is treated 
as "potential" capital. It becomes actual capital only when it joins hands with other resources 
to undertake a productive activity. Islam recognizes the time value of money, but only when 
it acts as capital, not when it is "potential" capital. 
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2. Regulation of Islamic Finance 
Financial institutions seeking to offer shari‘a -compliant products typically have a shari‘a  
supervisory board (or at a minimum, a shari‘a  counselor). The shari‘a  board is to review and 
approve financial practices and activities for compliance with Islamic principles. Such 
expertise raises the attractiveness of shari‘a -compliant financial intermediaries to investors 
considering Islamic banking.International institutions have been established to promote 
international consistency in Islamic finance. The Accounting and Auditing Organization for 
Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), founded in 1991 and located in Bahrain, issues 
international standards on accounting, auditing, and corporate governance. It has 200 
members from 45 countries; its membership includes central banks, Islamic financial 
institutions, and other bodies in the Islamic banking and finance industry. Another regulatory 
body is the Islamic Financial Services Boards (IFSB), which began operations in 2003 and is 
based in Malaysia. IFSB puts forth standards for supervision and regulation. Many leading 
Islamic financial centers around the world have adopted international SCF regulation 
standards.U.S. federal banking regulators have provided some formal guidance about Islamic 
products. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) issued two directives 
concerning shari‘a  compliant mortgage products. In 1997, the OCC issued guidance about 
ijara (“lease”), a financial structure in which the financial intermediary purchases and 
subsequently leases an asset to a consumer for a fee. In 1999, the OCC recognized murabaha 
(“cost-plus”), under which the financial intermediary buys an asset for a customer with the 
understanding that the customer will buy the asset back for a higher fee. 
Standardization of Islamic finance regulations has been of increasing interest in the industry. 
shari‘a  is open to interpretation and Islamic scholars are not in complete agreement regarding 
what constitutes SCF. Islamic finance laws and regulatory practices vary across countries. 
The lack of concurrent viewpoints makes it difficult to standardize Islamic financing. 
Standardization also may be challenging because the maturity of Islamic finance markets 
varies from country to country, with some markets well-established and others that are more 
nascent. Without standardization, some industry officials express concern that shari‘a -
compliance risk may grow. The lack of standardization across Islamic finance markets raises 
legal uncertainty that a contract will not be recognized as valid under Islamic law by all 
Islamic scholars. This uncertainty has been highlighted by a recent dispute between 
Lebanon’s Blom Bank and Kuwait’s Islamic firm Investment Dar over whether or not a 
contract between the two entities was compliant with Islamic principles and if payment should 
be made. Many observers view standardization of SCF regulations as important in increasing 
the marketability and acceptance of Islamic products. Over the years, there have been 
numerous initiatives to improve regulatory practices. For example, in 2009, the IFSB 
published guiding principals on issues such as governance and capital adequacy requirements 
for various financial products. The AAOIFI is in the process of developing new standards in 
risk management and corporate governance. 
3. Basic Islamic financial instruments 
Islamic markets offer different instruments to satisfy providers and users of funds in a variety 
of ways: sales, trade financing, and investment. Basic instruments include cost-plus financing  
(murabaha), profit-sharing (mudaraba) ,leasing (ijara), partnership (musharaka) ,and for 
ward sale (bay’ salam), Deferred-payment sale (bay’ mu’ajjal) and deferred-delivery sale 
(bay’salam) contracts, in addition to spot sales, are used for conducting credit sales. In a 
deferred-payment sale, delivery of the product is taken on the spot but delivery of the payment 
is delayed for an agreed period. Payment can be made in a lump sum or in installments, 
provided there is no extra charge for the delay. A deferred-delivery sale is similar to a forward 
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contract where delivery of the product is in the future in exchange for payment on the spot 
market. 
 These instruments serve as the basic building blocks for developing a wide array of more 
complex financial instruments, suggesting that there is great potential for financial innovation 
and expansion in Islamic financial markets. 
There are several methods of Islamic financing. However, in the world of  commercial 
financing and more particularly, project financing, certain methods are more commonly 
encountered than others. These are set out below. 
 
A. Trade with markup or cost-plus sale (murabaha). One of the most widely used 
instruments for short-term financing is based on the traditional notion of purchase finance. 
The investor undertakes to supply specific goods or commodities, incorporating a mutually 
agreed contract for resale to the client and a mutually negotiated margin. 
Around 75 percent of Islamic financial transactions are cost-plus sales. 
Murabaha was originally an exchange transaction in which a trader purchases items required 
by an end user. The trader then sells those items to the end-user at a price that is calculated 
using an agreed profit margin over the costs incurred by the trader. 
To be in consonance with the principles of Islamic finance governing exchange transactions 
every murabaha transaction must meet the following conditions: 
Murabaha transactions may be undertaken only where the client of a bank, or financial 
institution, wants to purchase a commodity. This type of transaction cannot be effected in 
cases where the client wants to get funds for a purpose other than purchasing a commodity, 
like payment of salaries, settlement of bills or other liabilities. 
To make it a valid transaction it is necessary that the commodity is really purchased by the 
bank and it comes into the ownership and possession (physical or constructive) of the bank 
so that it may assume the risk of the commodity so far as it remains under its ownership and 
possession. 
After acquiring the ownership and possession of the commodity it should be sold to the client 
through a valid sale. 
Some quarters have equated murabahah transactions to interest-based loans. However, there 
are many significant factors that distinguish a murabaha contract from a riba-based one. 
Some of them are the following: 
In the event of default by the end user, the financer only has recourse to the items financed, 
and no further mark-up or penalty may be applied to the sum outstanding. This means that 
the amount to be repaid does not go on increasing with passage of time as in the case of 
amounts borrowed from conventional banks on interest. Also, in conventional financing, the 
bank gives loans to its clients without ever being concerned how the money is being put to 
use. 
In the event of a murabahah transaction, no money is loaned to the client. Rather, the 
financing party purchases the goods himself, based on the requirement of the client. This 
ensures that financing is always asset-based. In effect, this type of financing creates real assets 
and inventories. 
Another major difference between a murabahah contract and an interest-based one is that the 
financier cannot be unconcerned about the purposes for which the asset being leased is to be 
put to use. Conventional banks have no compunction in lending to gambling houses or liquor 
companies, or even pornographic filmmakers. 
Islamic principles of finance are based on a well-established rule which dictates that “The 
benefit of a thing is a return for the liability for loss from that thing”. Hence, in a murabahah 
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transaction the bank or financier assumes the risk by purchasing the commodity before he 
sells it at a markup. 
This mark up is considered as the reward of the risk he assumes. Interest-bearing loans assume 
no risks whatsoever. In other words, because the bank takes title to the goods, and is therefore 
engaged in buying and selling, its profit derives from a real service that entails a certain risk. 
This aspect lends the transaction legitimacy. 
Most scholars have ruled that, to serve as a deterrent to such as may willfully delay payments, 
the financer may get the buyer to agree, at the time of the contract, to make a pre-specified 
donation to an agreed charity in case of late payment of monthly installments. 
These scholars, however, caution that this device should be used to the minimum extent and 
only in cases where musharakah or mudarabah are not practicable for one reason or another. 
B. Profit-sharing agreement (mudaraba). This is identical to an investment fund in which 
managers handle a pool of funds. The agent-manager has relatively limited liability while 
having sufficient incentives to perform. The capital is invested in broadly defined activities, 
and the terms of profit and risk sharing are customized for each investment. The maturity 
structure ranges from short to medium term and is more suitable for trade activities.  
Mudaraba implies a contract between two parties whereby one party, the rabb al-mal 
(beneficial owner or the sleeping partner), entrusts money to the other party called the 
mudarib (managing trustee or the labour partner). The mudarib is to utilize it in an agreed 
manner and then returns to the rabb al-mal the principal and the pre-agreed share of the profit. 
He keeps for himself what remains of such profits. 
The following rules must govern all Mudaraba transactions: 
• The division of profits between the two parties must necessarily be on a proportional 
basis and cannot be a lump sum or guaranteed return. 
• The investor is not liable for losses beyond the capital he has contributed. The mudarib 
does not share in the losses except for the loss of his time and efforts. 
• Briefly, an Islamic bank lends money to a client to finance a factory, for example, in 
return for which the bank will get a specified percentage of the factory's net profits 
every year for a designated period. This share of the profits provides for repayment of 
the principal and a profit for the bank to pass on to its depositors. Should the factory 
lose money, the bank, its depositors and the borrower all jointly absorb the losses, 
thereby putting into practice the pivotal Islamic principle that the providers and users 
of capital should share risks and rewards. 
Islamic banks use this instrument to finance those seeking investments to run their own 
enterprises or professional units, whether they be physicians or engineers or traders or 
craftsmen. 
The bank provides the adequate finance as a capital owner in exchange of a share in the profit 
to be agreed upon. 
It is worth noting that this mode is a high risk for the bank because the bank delivers capital 
to the mudarib who undertakes the work and management and the mudarib shall only be a 
guarantor in case of negligence and trespass. Islamic banks usually take the necessary 
precautions to decrease the risk and to guarantee a better execution for the mudaraba and 
pursue this objective with seriousness. 
However, it may be noted that, under mudarabah, the liability of the financier is limited to 
the extent of his contribution to the capital, and no more. 
C. Equity participation (musharaka). This is analogous to a classical joint venture. Both 
entrepreneur and investor contribute to the capital (assets, technical and managerial expertise, 
working capital, 
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etc.) of the operation in varying degrees and agree to share the returns (as well as the risks) 
in proportions agreed to in advance. Traditionally,this form of transaction has been used for 
financing fixed assets and working capital of medium- and long-term duration. 
Musharaka is a partnership, normally of limited duration, formed to carry out a specific 
project. 
It is, therefore, similar to a Western-style joint venture, and is also regarded by some as the 
purest form of Islamic financial instrument, since it conforms to the underlying partnership 
principles of sharing in, and benefiting from, risk. Participation in a musharaka can either be 
in a new project, or by providing additional funds for an existing one. Profits are divided on 
a pre-determined basis, and any losses shared in proportion to the capital contribution. In this 
case, the bank enters into a partnership with a client in which both share the equity capital- 
and maybe even the management -of a project or deal, and both share in the profits or losses 
according to their equity shareholding. There are two basic types of musharaka: 
i. Sharikah al milk: partnership based on joint ownership. This may be voluntary e.g. in the 
purchase of a ship, or involuntary e.g. as a result of inheritance. 
ii. Sharikah al uqud: partnership based on a contractual relationship. 
There are five subdivisions: 
1. Sharikat al Mufawadah (full authority and obligation): a limited partnership with equal 
capital contributions, responsibility, full authority on behalf of others, and responsibility for 
liabilities,incurred through the normal course of business. 
2. Sharikat al Inan (restricted authority and obligation): a limited partnership with unequal 
capital contributions. They do not share equal responsibility, and this reflects their share of 
the profits. 
3. Sharikat al Wujuh (goodwill /credit worthiness): companies based on the reputation of one 
or both parties, typically small scale business. 
4. Sharikat al Abdan (labour, skill and management): a company based on the contribution 
of human efforts, no capital contributions, again, typically small scale business. 
5. Sharikat al Mudaraba: a mudaraba 
D. Leasing (ijara). Another popular instrument, accounting for 
about 10 percent of Islamic financial transactions, is leasing. Leasing is designed for financing 
vehicles, machinery, equipment, and aircraft. 
Different forms of leasing are permissible, including leases where a 
portion of the installment payment goes toward the final purchase (with the transfer of 
ownership to the lessee). 
 
Ijarah can be defined as a process by which " usufruct of a particular property is transferred 
to another person in exchange for a rent claimed from him/her". In many respects, Ijarah 
resembles leasing as it is practiced in today’s commercial world. 
The distinguishing feature of this mode is that the assets remain the property of the Islamic 
bank to put them up for rent every time the lease period terminates so as not to remain 
unutilized for long periods of time. Under ijarah the bank or the leasing company assumes 
the risk of recession or diminishing demand for these assets. 
To be in consonance with the principles of Islamic finance governing financial transactions 
every ijarah transaction must meet the following conditions: 
• It is a condition that the object leased must not be perishable or consumable. 
• The lease is for the utilization not the consumption of the asset. 
• It is a condition that the subject of the contract must actually and legally be attainable. 
It is not permissible to lease something that cannot be delivered. 
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• The lessee must ensure that the asset is used for the purpose it is made for. The lessee 
shall comply with the provisions of the contract. The lessee also shall not benefit from 
the asset in a way more than what has been agreed upon. 
• It is not permitted to lease real estate to be used as an interest based bank or a bar. 
However it is permissible to lease property to those whose major activities are 
permissible or halal even if they include some secondary prohibited practices. 
• The lessor must not only deliver the asset on time, on the date of commencement of 
lease, but also ensure that the lessor delivers those accessories as well which are 
essential for the lessee to benefit from the asset as per the norms. 
• The lease contract must state the lease period clearly. Renewal terms must also be 
stated clearly, and things like the rentals for all subsequent years, after the first year, 
should not mention clauses like ‘left to the sole discretion of the lessor’ and the like. 
• The rental must be money. The lease rent falls due from the receipt of the asset by the 
lessee, not the date the contract is signed. 
• The amount and timing of the lease payments should be agreed in advance. However, 
the agreed schedule and amount of those payments need not be uniform. 
• It is permissible for the two parties to agree during the lease period to review the lease 
period or the rental or both. That is because the lease contract occurs periodically 
unlike the sale contract where the transfer of ownership is immediate. 
• The lessor bears the liabilities when leasing the asset such as damage to the asset, 
payment of premium cost and basic maintenance. 
•  There is no objection to authorizing the lessee to undertake all the above but the costs 
thereof must be borne by the lessor/owner. 
• The lessor/owner bears all the costs of the legally binding basic maintenance and these 
are operations on which the permanence and suitability of the leased object depend. 
The lessor also bears the cost of the replacement of durable parts. However, it is 
permissible to make the lessee bear the cost of ordinary routine maintenance, because 
this cost is normally known and can be considered as part of the rental. 
• The conditions of usage of the leased items must be stated. The lessor must have full 
possession and legal ownership of the asset prior to leasing it. 
• A price cannot be pre-determined for the sale of the asset at the expiry of the lease. 
However, lessor and lessee may agree to the continuation of the lease or the sale of 
the leased asset to the lessee under a new agreement at the end of the initial lease 
period. 
• In the event of late payment of rental, the Ijarah may be terminated immediately. 
• The lessor may claim compensation for any damage caused to the leased assets as a 
result of negligence on the part of the lessee. 
Literally, Ijarah means to give something on rent. As a term of Islamic Fiqh, Ijarah can also 
refer to wages paid to a person in consideration of the services rendered by him/her. In the 
above discussion, the term Ijarah is used to represent the usufructs of assets and properties, 
and not to the services of human beings. 
 
E. Salam is one of the basic conditions for the validity of sale in  shari‘a  that the commodity 
intended to be sold must be in the physical or constructive possession of the seller. This 
condition has 
three implications: 
First, the commodity must be existing; a commodity that does not exist at the time of sale 
cannot be sold. 
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Second, the seller should have acquired the ownership of that commodity. If the commodity 
exists but the seller does not own it, he cannot sell it to anybody. 
Third, mere ownership is not enough. It should have come in the possession of the seller, 
either physically or constructively. If the seller owns a commodity, but he has not acquired 
its delivery by himself or through an agent, he cannot sell it. 
There are only two exceptions to this general principle in  shari‘a . One is Salam and the other 
is Istisna. 
Both are sales of a special nature. 
Salam, or Bay-Salaam as it is also called, is a sale whereby the seller undertakes to supply 
some specific goods to the buyer at a future date in exchange for an advanced price fully paid 
on the spot. 
Here the price is paid in cash, but the supply of the purchased goods is deferred. The buyer is 
called "Rabb-us-Salam", the seller is "Muslam ilaih", the cash price is "ra's-ul-mal", and the 
purchased 
commodity is termed as "muslam fih". 
The  shari‘a  allows Salam subject to certain conditions. The basic purpose of this sale was 
to meet the needs of the small farmers who needed money to grow their crops and to feed 
their family up to the time of their harvest. After the prohibition of riba they could not take 
usurious loans. Therefore, it was allowed for them to sell the agricultural products in advance. 
Similarly, the traders of Arabia used to export goods to other places and to import other goods 
to their homeland. They needed money to undertake this type of business. They could not 
borrow from the usurers after the prohibition of riba. It was, therefore, allowed for them that 
they sell the goods in advance. After receiving their cash price, they could easily undertake 
the aforesaid business. Salam was beneficial to the seller, because he received the price in 
advance, and it was beneficial to the buyer also, because normally, the price in Salam used to 
be lower than price in spot sales. 
The permissibility of Salam was an exception to the general rule that prohibits forward sales. 
Therefore, it was subjected to some strict conditions. 
Conditions of Salam: 
It is necessary for the validity of Salam that the buyer pays the price in full to the seller at the 
time of effecting the sale. This is necessary because in the absence of full payment by the 
buyer, it will be tantamount to a sale of debt against debt, which is expressly prohibited. 
Moreover, the basic wisdom behind the permissibility of Salam is to fulfill the instant needs 
of the seller. If the price is not paid to him in full, the basic purpose of the transaction will be 
defeated. 
Salam can be effected in those commodities only whose quality and quantity can be specified 
exactly. The things whose quality or quantity is not determined by the specification cannot 
be sold through the contract of Salam. For example, the precious stones cannot be sold on the 
basis of Salam, because every piece of precious stones is normally different from the other 
either in its 
quality or in its size or weight and their exact specification is not generally possible. 
Salam cannot be effected on a particular commodity or on a product of a particular field or 
farm. 
For example, if the seller undertakes to supply wheat of a particular field, or the fruit of a 
particular tree, the Salam will not be valid, because there is a possibility that produce of that 
particular field or the fruit of that tree is destroyed before the delivery, and in the presence of 
this possibility the delivery remains uncertain. The same rule is applicable to every 
commodity whose supply is not certain. It is necessary that the quality of the commodity 
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(intended to be purchased through Salam) be fully specified leaving no ambiguity that may 
lead to dispute. All the possible details in this respect must be expressly mentioned. 
It is also necessary that the quantity of the commodity be agreed upon in unequivocal terms. 
If the commodity is quantified in weights according to the usage of its traders, its weight must 
be determined, and if it is quantified through measures, its exact measure should be known. 
What is normally weighed cannot be specified in measures and vice versa. 
The exact date of delivery must be specified in the contract. 
Salam cannot be effected in respect of those things that must be delivered at the spot. For 
example, if gold is purchased in exchange for silver, it is necessary, according to  shari‘a , 
that the delivery of both be simultaneous. Here, Salam cannot work. Similarly, if wheat is 
bartered for barley, the simultaneous delivery of both is necessary for the validity of sale, 
therefore, the contract of Salam in this case is not allowed. 
It is permissible to draw a Salam sale contract on one whole thing but to be possessed at 
different times in specific parts. 
Salam sale is not permissible on existing commodities because damage and deterioration 
cannot be assured before delivery on the due date. Delivery may become impossible. 
Salam is permissible on a commodity of a specific locality if it is assured that it is almost 
always available in that locality and it rarely becomes unavailable. 
The place of delivery must be stated in the contract if the commodity needs loading or 
transportation expenses. 
It is permissible to take mortgage and guarantor on Salam debt to guarantee that the seller 
satisfies his obligation by delivering the commodity sold, which is a liability on the due date. 
It is not permissible for the buyer of a Salam commodity to sell it before receiving it because 
that is similar to the prohibited sale of debts before holding. It is known that the Salam 
commodity is a liability debt on the seller and not an existing commodity. Instead of that, it 
is permissible for the buyer to draw a parallel Salam contract without connecting it to the first 
Salam contract. 
Salam sale is suitable for the finance of agriculture operations, where the bank can transact 
with farmers who are expected to have the commodity in plenty during harvest either from 
their own crops or crops of others, which they can buy and deliver in case their crops fail. 
Thus the bank renders great services to the farmers in their way to achieve their production 
targets. 
Salam sale is also used to finance commercial and industrial activities, especially phases prior 
to production and export of commodities and that is by purchasing them on Salam and 
marketing them for lucrative prices. 
The Salam sale is applied by banks in financing craftsmen and small producers by supplying 
them with inputs of production as a Salam capital in exchange for some of their commodities 
to remarket. 
The scope of Salam sale is large enough to cover the needs of various people such as farmers, 
industrialists, contractors or traders. It can cover the finance of operational costs and capital 
goods. 
F. Istisna is the second kind of sale where a commodity is transacted before it comes into 
existence. 
It means to order a manufacturer to manufacture a specific commodity for the purchaser. If 
the manufacturer undertakes to manufacture the goods for him, the transaction of Istisna 
comes into 
existence. But it is necessary for the validity of Istisna that the price is fixed with the consent 
of the parties and that necessary specification of the commodity (intended to be 
manufactured) is fully settled between them. 
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The contract of Istisna creates a moral obligation on the manufacturer to manufacture the 
goods, but before he starts the work, any one of the parties may cancel the contract after 
giving notice to the other. 
But after the manufacturer has started the work, the contract cannot be cancelled unilaterally. 
However, the party placing the order has the right to retract if the commodity does not 
conform to the specifications demanded. 
Istisna as a Mode of Financing: can be used for providing the facility of financing in certain 
transactions, especially in the sector of house financing. 
If the client has his own land and he seeks financing for the construction of a house, the 
financier may undertake to construct the house on that open land, on the basis of Istisna, and 
if the client has no land and he wants to purchase the land also, the financier may undertake 
to provide him a constructed house 
on the specified piece of land. 
Since it is not necessary in Istisna that the price is paid in advance, nor is it necessary that it 
is paid at the time of the delivery, rather, it may be deferred to any time according to the 
agreement of the parties, therefore, the time of payment may be fixed in whatever manner 
they wish. The payment may also be in installments. 
On the other hand, it is not necessary that the financier himself construct the house. He can 
enter into a parallel contract of Istisna with a third party, or may hire the services of a 
contractor (other than the client). In both cases, he can calculate his cost and fix the price of 
Istisna with his client in a manner that may give him a reasonable profit over his cost. The 
payment of installments by the client may start, in this case, right from the day when the 
contract of Istisna is signed by the parties, and may continue during the construction of the 
house and after it is handed over to the client. In order to secure the payments of installments, 
the bank, as a security, may keep the title deeds of the house or land, or any other property, 
until the client pays the last installment. 
The bank, in this case, will be responsible for the construction of the house in full conformity 
with the specifications detailed in the agreement. In case of discrepancy, the financier will 
undertake such alterations at his own cost as may be necessary for bringing it in harmony 
with the terms of the contract. 
The instrument of Istisna may also be used for project financing on similar lines. If a client 
wants to install machinery in his factory, and the machinery needs to be manufactured, the 
financier may undertake to prepare the machinery through the contract of Istisna according 
to the aforesaid procedure. The same principles will be fully applicable to the construction of 
a building for the industry. 
Istisna contracts open wide fields of application for the Islamic banks to finance the public 
needs and the vital interests of the society to develop the Islamic economy. Istisna contracts 
are applied in high technology industries such as the aircraft industry, locomotive and ship 
building industries, in addition to the different types of machines produced in large factories 
or workshops. The Istisna contract is also applied in the construction industry for apartment 
buildings, hospitals, schools, and universities. 
Difference between Istisna and Salam: 
1. The subject of Istisna is always a thing that needs manufacturing, while Salam can be 
effected on anything, no matter whether it needs manufacturing or not. 
2. It is necessary for Salam that the price is paid in advance, while it is not necessary in Istisna. 
3. The contract of Salam, once effected, cannot be cancelled unilaterally, while the contract 
of Istisna can be cancelled before the manufacturer starts the work. 
4. The time of delivery is an essential part of the sale in Salam while it is not necessary in 
Istisna that the time of the delivery be fixed. 
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5. The buyer may stipulate in the Istisna contract that the commodity shall be manufactured 
or produced by a specific manufacturer, or manufactured from specific materials. This is not 
permitted in the case of Salam sale. 
Difference Between Istisna and Ijarah : 
It should also be kept in mind that the manufacturer, in Istisna, undertakes to make the 
required goods with his own material. Therefore, this transaction implies that the 
manufacturer shall obtain the material, if it is not already with him, and shall undertake the 
work required for making the ordered goods with it. 
However, if the customer provides the material, and the manufacturer is required to use his 
labor and skill only, the transaction is not Istisna. In this case it will be a transaction of Ijarah 
whereby the services of a person are retained for a specified fee paid to him. 
 
G. Islamic bonds (Sukuk) : 
Muslim jurists subject the buying and selling of debt obligations to certain conditions in order 
to comply with the prohibition of riba (interest), gharar (uncertainty), and maysir (gambling). 
specify these conditions in detail. In summary, the debt must be a genuine one i.e., it must 
not be a subterfuge to borrow money such as an asset-linked buy-back arrangement. The 
debtor must acknowledge the trade and creditors must be known, accessible, and sound. 
Trading must be on a spot basis and not against debt. Importantly, the price cannot be other 
than the face value. In line with these principles, early doctrine on interest-free finance 
disallowed corporate or government bonds and the discounting of bills. Pressures for 
innovation have resulted in finding a way out of these limitations, admitting ‘financial 
engineering’. In particular, leasing-based bonds (sukuk al-ijara) have been developed. 
Although other sukuk have been issued, eg sukuk al-mudaraba, sukuk al-musharaka, sukuk 
al-murabaha, the ijara sukuk remains the most popular.  
Sukuk means participation certificate, and is commonly referred to as an ‘Islamic bond’. 
Techniques similar to conventional structured finance securities are employed, with sukuk 
akin to pass-through certificates. A sakk simply represents a proportional or undivided 
ownership interest in an asset or pool of assets . Islamic bonds are more useful if they can be 
traded on the secondary market to gain liquidity. As indicated above, certain requirements 
must be met with respect to the trading capacity of the bonds on the Islamic financial market. 
Specifically, they cannot represent a debt (in Islam, debt-selling is forbidden), as conventional 
bonds can. Instead they must constitute property of an approved asset. Such a bond is obtained 
through the securitization of the asset, the property of which is divided into equally valued 
units and incorporated in the sukuk certificates. The value of the sukuk thus remains connected 
to the value of the underlying asset. While they come in zero coupon and coupon versions, 
the productivity and return is linked to the profit of the underlying asset and not to an interest 
rate (although an interest rate such as LIBOR can be used as a ‘benchmark’).  
Consider, for example, the case of the sukuk al-ijara. The originator holds assets (land, 
buildings, aircraft, ships, etc) that are to constitute the basis of the returns to the sukuk 
investor. These assets are sold by the originator to a special purpose vehicle (SPV) and then 
are leased back at a specified rental. The SPV securitizes the assets by issuing sukuk 
certificates that can be purchased by investors. Each sukukIn what ways does Islamic banking 
differ from conventional finance?  
certificate represents a share in the ownership of the assets, entitling the investor to periodic 
distributions from the SPV funded by the originator’s rental payments on the leased assets. 
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The returns can be either fixed rate or floating rate (often referenced to LIBOR as a 
‘benchmark’) depending on the originator.  
So far, AAOIFI (the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions) 
has issued Standards for fourteen types of sukuk .These can be broadly grouped into sukuk 
that bear predetermined returns and sukuk that allow for sharing of profit and, in some 
instances, loss. Sukuk al-murabaha and sukuk al-murabaha are examples of profit-and-loss-
sharing sukuk. To date, most issued sukuk have borne predetermined returns, and the majority 
of such sukuk have been sukuk al-ijara, frequently at a predetermined rate of return.  
In fact, the basic structure of a sukuk is very flexible and can be varied in a number of ways. 
The underlying assets that are pooled and securitized can be ijara, murabaha, istisnaa or 
musharaka receivables, or combinations of them, and the rates of return can be fixed, floating 
or zero coupon. Investment risks (credit risk, interest rate risk, foreign exchange risk, market 
price risk, liquidity risk) are much the same as those of conventional bonds, and depend on 
the way the securitization is structured, although one unique risk is that of shari’a compliance, 
a factor which also governs the tradeability of the sukuk.  
Indeed, it is the potential for tradeability that primarily makes for the popularity of sukuk al-
ijara. Ijara, though less commonly employed than murabaha as an asset in Islamic banks’ 
balance sheets offers much greater flexibility for the Islamic bond market. Each security 
called sukuk-al-ijara represents a pro rata ownership of physical assets as against a pro rata 
share in financial claims or debt in the case of sukuk-al-murabaha. While debt can only be 
transferred at par, ownership in physical assets can always be transferred at a mutually 
negotiated price. Hence sukuk-al-ijara allow for creation of a secondary market since they 
represent a share in the ownership of a physical asset. 
In 2010 Sukuk issuances hit a record of US$47.78 billion if compared to the last five years; 
managing to surpass 2007 peak level by around 7% and 50% if compared to 2009. If this was 
to convey something, it would be the increasing confidence the global markets are regaining. 
According to Dow Jones Islamic Markets Indices December Commentary, the DJIM 
Citigroup Sukuk Index gained 9.1% in 2010 finishing at 125.32 points. 
22 
 
 
As at end-2012, the value of outstanding global sukuk topped USD 229.4 billion – a record 
high helped by new issuances worth USD 131.2 billion. Malaysia, Qatar, the UAE, Saudi 
Arabia and Indonesia feature among the countries that have been at the forefront of growth 
in the sukuk primary market. Third quarter of 2012 saw the debut of the first Islamic Basel 
III compliant Tier I structure, closely followed in first quarter of 2013 by another Islamic 
bank, both from the UAE, successfully raising US$1b each. 
Finally, Islam has laid down a number of conditions to ensure that credit expands in step with 
the growth of the real rector. Some of these conditions are: 
1. The asset which is being sold or leased must be real, and not imaginary or notional; 
2. The seller must own and possess the goods being sold or leased; 
3. The transaction must be a genuine trade transaction with the full intention of giving and 
taking delivery; and 
4. The debt cannot be sold and thus the risk of default associated with it must be borne by the 
lender himself. 
The first condition will help eliminate most of the speculative and gambling transactions 
which involve notional goods and which constituted a major part of the derivatives 
transactions during the current crisis. The second condition will help ensure that the seller (or 
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lessor) also shares a part of the risk to be able to get a share in the return. Once the seller 
(financier) acquires ownership and possession of the goods for sale or lease, he/she bears the 
risk. This condition will put a constraint on short sales, and thereby remove the possibility of 
a steep decline in asset prices during a downturn. The  shari‘a  has, however, made an 
exception to this rule in the case of salam and istisna where the goods are not already available 
in the market and need to be produced or manufactured before delivery. This will help ensure 
that financing expands in step with the rise of the real economy and thereby help curb 
excessive credit expansion. 
The third and the fourth conditions will not only help eliminate a great deal of speculative 
and derivatives transactions where there is no intention of giving or taking delivery, but also 
motivate the creditor to be more cautious in evaluating the credit risk. This will prevent an 
unnecessary explosion in the volume and value of transactions and also help keep the rise in 
debt to be in step with the rise of the real economy. It will also release a greater volume of 
financial resources for the real sector and, thereby, help expand employment and self-
employment opportunities and the production of need-fulfilling goods and services. 
The discipline that Islam wishes to introduce in the financial system may not materialize 
unless the governments reduce their borrowing from the central bank to a level that is in 
harmony with the goal of price and financial stability. Even borrowing from the private sector 
should be primarily for development that will increase its ability to repay. Borrowing for 
meeting current spending needs to be avoided except in extreme circumstances. This is 
because borrowing does not eliminate the ultimate need for sacrifice. 
Without this consciousness about the ultimate need for sacrifice, the need for borrowing is 
most likely to become path dependent. 
A number of objections may be raised here against these conditions. One of these is that 
hedging is a genuine need of the economy and the restrictions specified above may stand 
against it. Genuine hedging or insurance which is undertaken by a person or firm to provide 
protection against losses actually incurred has been recognized by Muslim jurists. However, 
what is prohibited is ‘hedging’ that is not related to a real transaction and is rather of a 
speculative and gambling nature. A second objection may be that all these conditions will 
tend to shrink the size of the economy by reducing the number and volume of derivatives 
transactions. There is not doubt that the number of transactions will be reduced. However, it 
will be primarily those transactions which are of a speculative and gambling nature and are 
generally recognized to be zero-sum games. These have rarely contributed significantly to 
total real output. The compounded annual rate of growth of total outstanding derivatives 
between 2000 and 2007 was 29.9 percent per annum while that in total real world output was 
only 3.1 percent per annum. Hence a decline in speculative and gambling transactions is not 
likely to hurt the real economy significantly. While a restriction on such transactions will cut 
the commissions earned by speculators during an artificially generated boom, it will help 
them avert losses and bankruptcy that become unavoidable during the decline and lead to a 
financial crisis. 
 
4. ISLAMIC BANKING 
 
The emergence of Islamic banking in recent years is one of the most important trends in the 
economic sector, and with the estimated 1.6 billion Muslims worldwide, it’s ripe for growth 
potential. 
There has always been a demand among Muslims for financial products and services that 
conform to  shari‘a  (Islamic Law). The development of viable alternatives to conventional 
finance increasingly enables Muslims to participate in the financial world without violating 
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their Islamic principles and without bearing the economic penalty that comes from non-
participation, especially with the recent growth of oil prices. 
Currently, the Islamic banking industry consists of several hundred billion dollars, and more 
than 300 financial institutions in and outside the Muslim world. There is $300 billion in assets 
managed according to Islamic principles, ranging from commercial to investment banks and 
investment funds, all providing Islamic products. 
Others estimate the industry to be even larger. Financial Services Authority, the financial 
services regulator in the United Kingdom, for example, recently suggested Islamic banking 
was as large as $500 billion. Standard & Poor’s, a rating agency, estimates that the sukuk 
(deed) market has reached $70 billion, and will top the $160 billion mark by the end of the 
decade. Islamic financial services are now evolving from a niche market to the mainstream. 
In addition to the sheer number of Muslims worldwide, global financial institutions are taking 
a strong interest in Islamic products since the industry is in its nascent stage. Products have 
yet to be commoditized from competition, therefore allowing profit margins to remain high. 
What is Islamic banking? 
Islamic banking can be considered banking with a conscience. Islamic banks each have a  
shari‘a  board made up of  shari‘a  scholars as well as financial experts who are responsible 
for determining what activities are and are not  shari‘a -compliant. 
Islamic banking is based on two main financial principles. Firstly, investment is to be made 
in the private sector through interest-free financing. Secondly, the development of financial 
instruments is to be done on the basis of profit and loss sharing as well as sharing risks. 
Further, Islamic banking is built around  shari‘a , mainly prohibiting the charging of interest. 
Because Islam considers interest an unjustified increase of capital, with no effort made to earn 
it, it is considered of false value, and therefore is prohibited. 
However, there are many arguments about the prohibition of interest in Islam. The first 
argument is that interest rates have no moral foundation. The second is that abstinence from 
consumption is not a justification of rewards. 
Lastly, some argue that there are risks to justify the supplement of payment for capital lending 
if the loan is guaranteed. 
In addition to the prohibition of interest payments, Islamic law treats money strictly as a 
medium of exchange. In other words, money, in itself, does not have any inherent value, and 
therefore it should not lead to the production of more money. In Islamic banking, the 
creditor/debtor relationship is defined differently than in the secular financial world. The 
creditor, or provider, of funds who becomes a partner in a project assumes the risk activity 
with the entrepreneur and shares profits as well as losses. 
The creation of incremental wealth justifies the share of profit between the borrower and the 
lender of money, but does not guarantee a fixed return. 
Some of the principle instruments involved in the aforementioned form of resource 
mobilization include the following: 
Trade financing and cost-plus mark-up on traded goods (murabaha). 
Profit-sharing (mudarabah) and equity participation (musharaka) in which cost-sharing 
among partners is also included. 
Rental on purchased equipment (ijara). 
Islamic banking portfolio using secondary financing instruments, such as shares and stocks 
revolving around the above-mentioned instruments. 
ISLAMIC Conventional vs. Islamic banking CONVENTIONAL  
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In particular, Islamic banks are already serving 38 million customers globally, two-thirds of 
who reside in seven countries, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Indonesia, and 
Turkey. One-fifth of the banking system assets across these countries have now transitioned 
to Islamic. In Saudi Arabia, supply push has seen share of Islamic banking cross 50percent 
of system assets. 
The global market for Islamic financial services, as measured by shari‘a  compliant assets, is 
estimated by TheCityUK to have increased in 2013, to a record $1,688bn (Chart 1). The 
industry is set to grow significantly in the years ahead. At the current rate of growth the market 
could top $2 trillion in assets by the end of 2014. The largest centres remain concentrated in 
Malaysia and the Middle East, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Kuwait (Chart 2). 
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Islamic finance has shown resilience at a time when the global economy has slowed and 
conventional banking in Western countries has been under pressure. Global assets of Islamic 
finance have doubled since the start of the economic slowdown. Considerable potential exists 
for expansion of Islamic finance.  
The Muslim population numbering some 1.6 billion accounts for nearly a quarter of the global 
population, but Sharia compliant assets make up only around 1percent of the world’s financial 
assets. Less than a fifth of Muslims worldwide currently use Islamic financial products. The 
extent of the industry’s penetration varies substantially 
 
There are over 700 institutions registered globally as sharia-compliant organisations in 
financial services. Of these, around 500 are full-fledged standalone institutions, and the 
remainder operate sharia-compliant products within a conventional institution or known as 
Islamic windows. Countries with most of the 430 firms reporting to The Banker’s survey 
include Bahrain and Indonesia with 74 and 71 firms respectively. Malaysia, Iran, Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia were in a group of countries with more than 50 firms.  
  
II. Corporate governance in Islamic Finance: BASIC CONCEPTS AND ISSUES 
 
A. Definition of corporate governance 
 
The agency problem arises because of the relationship between the owners and the 
management. The scandal in corporate governance made the scholars defining corporate 
governance based on the problem solving perspective or corporate affairs perspective. In 
addition, most definition states that internal governance mechanism involves board of 
directors and ownership structure while external involves to take over market and legal 
system. 
 
The governments of the 30 OECD countries have approved a revised version of the OECD's 
Principles of Corporate Governance adding new recommendations for good practice in 
corporate behaviour with a view to rebuilding and maintaining public trust in companies and 
stock markets. 
 
The revised Principles respond to a number of issues that have undermined the confidence of 
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investors in company management in recent years. They call on governments to ensure 
genuinely effective regulatory frameworks and on companies themselves to be truly 
accountable. They advocate an increased awareness among institutional investors and an 
effective role for shareholders in executive compensation. They also urge strengthened 
transparency and disclosure to counter conflicts of interest.   
 
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, first published in 1999, have been widely 
adopted as a benchmark both in OECD countries and elsewhere. They are used as one of 12 
key standards by the Financial Stability Forum for ensuring international financial stability 
and by the World Bank in its work to improve corporate governance in emerging markets.  
 
In 2002, OECD governments called for a review of the Principles to take account of 
developments in the corporate sector. The revised text is the product of a consultation process 
involving representatives of both OECD and non-OECD governments as well as of 
businesses and professional bodies, trade unions, civil society organisations and international 
standard-setting bodies. 
Researchers have defined corporate governance in a variety of ways, and the most widely 
cited definitions follow. The OECD defines CG as “a set of relationships between a 
company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate 
Governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, 
and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined”. 
This definition provides important attributes of CG and emphasizes transparency. However, 
it does not directly deal with the intrinsic issue of the business objectives that should guide 
the distribution of rights and responsibilities within the corporation. Indeed, the objectives of 
a corporation’s founders’, whether these be the 
increase of shareholders’ value or the pursuit of stakeholders’ interest, can be expected to 
affect such a distribution and shape the institutional structure and systems. In particular,the 
distribution of rights and responsibilities among shareholders and other stakeholders would 
be driven by the interests of whoever establishes the corporation and subsequently controls 
it. 
 
 
The revised Principles emphasise the importance of a regulatory framework in corporate 
governance that promotes efficient markets, facilitates effective enforcement and clearly 
defines the responsibilities between different supervisory, regulatory and enforcement 
authorities.  They also emphasise the need to ensure transparent lines of management 
responsibility within companies so as to make boards and management truly accountable.  
Other issues addressed by the revised Principles include:  
 
Institutional investors  
• They should disclose their corporate governance policies, how they decide on the use 
of their voting rights and how they manage conflicts of interest that may compromise 
their voting; 
• Restrictions on consultations between shareholders about their voting intentions 
should be eased to reduce the cost of informed ownership. 
    
 Shareholder rights 
• The rights of investors must be strengthened. Shareholders should be able to remove 
board members and participate effectively in the nomination and election processes; 
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• They should be able to make their views known about executive and board 
remuneration policy and any equity component should be subject to their approval. 
 
Conflicts of interest and auditor responsibility 
• A new principle calls for rating agencies and analysts to avoid conflicts of interest 
which could compromise their advice; 
• The duties of the auditor must be strengthened and include accountability to 
shareholders and a duty to the company to exercise due professional care when 
conducting an audit; 
• Auditors should be wholly independent and not be compromised by other relations 
with the company.   
 
Stakeholder rights and whistle-blower protection 
• The Principles make reference to the rights of stakeholders, whether established by 
law or through mutual agreements. 
• A new principle advocates protection for whistleblowers, including institutions 
through which their complaints or allegations can be addressed and provides for 
confidential access to a board member.  
 
Board responsibilities 
• The duties and responsibilities of the board have been clarified as fiduciary in nature, 
particularly important where company groups are concerned; 
• The principle covering board independence and objectivity has been extended to avoid 
conflicts of interest and to cover situations characterised by block and controlling 
shareholders, as well as the board's responsibility for oversight of internal control 
systems covering financial reporting. 
 
A definition by the finance committee on corporate governance in Malaysia in the report on 
corporate governance stated that: 
Corporate governance is the process and structure used to direct and manage the business and 
affairs of the company towards enhancing business prosperity and corporate accountability 
with the ultimate objective of realizing long term shareholder value, whilst taking account the 
interests of other stakeholders. 
This indicates that corporate governance is not only applied to the shareholders but the other 
stakeholders as well. 
 
B. Corporate governance system around the world 
1. Anglo-Saxon corporate governance system 
The Anglo-Saxon system is taking by the main source of firm’s finance. Therefore, the main 
concentration of Anglo-Saxon  corporate governance  is the shareholder interest where the 
principle is applied by given the right to each shareholder to vote pursuant to that the law 
found to be protecting the shareholder against the management where a shareholder can be 
found misusing the company money which might affect the shareholder  wealth. 
The composition of the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance system is one board of directors 
constituting of executives and non-executives. The executive directors are managers of the 
corporations; whereas the non-executive directors are representing the shareholders to 
monitor the manager in their day to day business. Both executive and non-executives 
directors’ members are appointed and dismissed by general assembly of shareholders . 
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2. Germanic corporate governance system 
The Germanic corporate governance system deals with the firm as an autonomous economic 
entity which may benefit to shareholders and stakeholders in the firm. Countries which 
implement this system use two board system consisting of a supervisory board and managing 
board. Supervisory board main duties are to appoint the managing dismiss managing board 
and to evaluate management performance. Germanic corporate governance system considers 
the bank as the main source of finance. Therefore, the bank 
has a significant voting right in shareholder’s assembly and also represents shareholders’ 
interest in a supervisory board. 
 
3. Latin corporate governance system 
The Latin corporate governance system is considered more flexible compared with previous 
systems. In a context of board of directors, Latin corporations have an option to select either 
one board as Anglo-Saxon system or two boards as in Germanic system, shareholders have 
more influence in the Latin system, i.e. in French legislation, shareholders can remove a 
director, which overrule on a share one vote system. 
 
4. Japanese corporate governance system 
The board of directors in Japanese system comprises a board of directors, an office of 
representative directors and an office of auditors. The president is the rarely the chairman of 
the board. Banks have high influence on the decision making of the management in the 
Japanese system. 
 
C. Shariah Governance in Islamic Finance 
Islamic financial institutions have the duty to ensure the compliance with shari‘a  principles 
in all aspects of their products, instruments, operations, practices and management which will 
be achieved by the establishment of a proper shari‘a  governance framework. Thus shari‘a  
supervision plays an essential role in the governance of Islamic financial institution and forms 
part of the principal component of the shari‘a  governance framework. One of the roles of the 
shari‘a  supervisory board is to advise the Islamic financial instutions on shari‘a  matters to 
ensure conformity with shari‘a  rule in its operations at all time, endorsing and validating 
relevant documentations pertaining to the products and services of the Islamic financial 
institutions. The ideal role of shari‘a  supervision involve ex ante and ex post aspects of 
shari‘a  governance and these include shari‘a  pronouncement, supervision and review.  
In this aspect, the Sharia governance framework in Malaysia is based on the centralised model 
as compared to the decentralized being practiced in the GCC countries.The centralized model 
is formed on the basis that the Central Bank itself has its own shari‘a  supervisory board called 
the shari‘a  Advisory Board by virtue of section 51 of the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009 
and all Islamic financial institutions are required to form their own shari‘a  committee which 
must comply with the rules set by the shari‘a  Advisory Board of the Central Bank. The 
importance of shari‘a  supervision is derived from five different resources namely religious, 
social,economic, legal and governance. The religious position is derived from the ability of 
shari‘a  scholars in understanding and interpreting shari‘a  principles to others. The social 
power of the shari‘a  
supervision provides confidence to the stakeholders about the legitimacy of the transactions 
and activities of the Islamic financial institutions. The economic power of the shari‘a  
supervision can be seen from the fact that the profitability of an Islamic financial institution 
is dependent on the 
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performance of shari‘a  scholars. As far as legal power is concerned it is derived from a variety 
of sources including regulators of the respective countries. The hierarchical position of shari‘a  
supervision under the shareholders of the Islamic financial institutions emphasizes it 
supremacy over other governance organs thus giving them authority to set their internal policy 
including task,responsibilities and relations with other governance organs in the Islamic 
financial institutions.  
The shari‘a  governance which refers to all the elements about the active role of the shari‘a  
board and compliance with shari‘a  is fundamental to Islamic banks in particular and the 
implementation of shari‘a  governance is encouraged by international institutions of 
regulations like Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institution 
(AAOIFI) and Islamic Financial Services BoardShariah board monitoring 
The SSB plays very important role in ensuring good shari‘a  governance. The role of the SSB 
is to include advising board of directors on shari‘a  matters to ensure that the operations 
comply with shari‘a  principles at all time, endorsing and validating relevant documentations 
pertaining to the products and services, as well as the internal policies and manuals and 
marketing advertisements. 
Dynamic and good shari‘a  governance is the very essence in the development of Islamic 
banking and finance sector in Malaysia. Good shari‘a  governance guarantees the dynamicity 
of Islamic financial growth. 
The interest of stakeholders may extend beyond the financial interest to ethical, religious or 
other values when requiring good corporate governance. In Islamic banks shareholders and 
Islamic scholars requires the operation of services offered to be under shari‘a  law otherwise 
it will be subject to process in no permission. Therefore, corporate governance through shari‘a  
operation is essential. 
Each Islamic bank or financial institution has in-house religious advisers, collectively known 
as SSB, as part of the internal governance structure of the institution, in some countries, 
authorities have created oversight arrangement, such as shari‘a  board in Islamic banking 
departments within supervisory agencies. These usually operate in connection with private 
independent market agents familiar with Islamic finance. 
SSB prerogatives lie in five main areas: certification of permissible financial instruments 
though fatwas (ex  ante shari‘a  audit), verification of transactions’ compliance with issued 
fatwa (ex post shari‘a  audit) the calculation and payment of Zakat, disposal of non shari‘a  
payment compliant earning, advise to the distribution of income or expenses among the bank 
shareholders and investment account holders. Each SBB issues a report to certify the shari‘a  
compliance of all financial transactions. In addition to SSB, most Islamic financial institutions 
have established another internal shari‘a  Review structure namely shari‘a  Review units. 
These units are independent of other departments or are an integral part of the internal audit 
and control department. 
In recent years, the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) has developed three Guiding 
Principles to help strengthen governance structures and processes in various segments of the 
Islamic financial services industry (IFSI) in line with its mandate to promote soundness and 
stability of the Islamic financial system.It was noted that in all three projects, concerns over 
the roles and functions of the Shari`ah boards, which constitute part of the broader 
governance system, have been a recurring theme. This is crucial,considering that compliance 
with Shari`ah rules and principles is the raison d'être of the IFSI. In fact, other IFSB standards 
– such as those on risk management, capital adequacy and supervisory review process – also 
contain requirements and recommendations aimed at ensuring that an appropriate Shari`ah 
governance system is in place. 
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Consequently, the IFSB Council, during its ninth meeting in Jeddah, approved the preparation 
of a set of Guiding Principles on the Shari`ah governance system, which is expected to: 
(a) complement other prudential standards issued by the IFSB by highlighting in more detail 
to the supervisory authorities in particular, and the industry’s other stakeholders in general, 
the components of a sound Shari`ah governance system, especially with regard to the 
competence, independence, confidentiality and consistency of Shari`ah boards; 
(b) facilitate better understanding of Shari`ah governance issues and how stakeholders should 
satisfy themselves that an appropriate and effective Shari`ah governance system is in place; 
(c) provide an enhanced degree of transparency in terms of issuance, and the audit/review 
process for compliance with Shari`ah rulings; and 
(d) provide greater harmonisation of the Shari`ah governance structures and procedures 
across jurisdictions, especially since there are increasing numbers of IIFS with cross-border 
operations. 
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D. Definition and Scope of Shari`ah Governance System 
 
The term “Shari`ah Governance System”, despite being commonly used within the IFSI to 
refer to structures and processes adopted by stakeholders in the IFSI (from financial regulators 
to market players) to ensure compliance with Shari`ah rules and principles, has not been 
properly defined in any of the existing standards. In the interests of clarity, this document 
shall adopt the following definition of “Shari`ah Governance System” and the other key 
terminology: 
“Shari`ah Governance System” refers to the set of institutional and organisational 
arrangements through which an IIFS ensures that there is effective independent oversight of 
Shari`ah compliance over each of the following structures and processes: 
(a) Issuance of relevant Shari`ah pronouncements/resolutions “Shari`ah 
pronouncements/resolutions” refers to a juristic opinion on any matter pertaining to Shari`ah 
issues in Islamic finance, given by the appropriately mandated Shari`ah board. In 
jurisdictions where there is a central authority such as the national Shari`ah board or Fatwa 
Council, that central authority has the power to issue such pronouncements/resolutions, 
resulting in the Shari`ah board at the IIFS usually focusing only on ensuring that the IIFS is 
compliant with the pronouncements/resolutions issued by the central authority.Once it is 
decided that a Shari`ah pronouncement/resolution should actually be implemented, it 
becomes a “Shari`ah ruling” (hukm al-Shar’i) with full legal effect that binds the IIFS.A 
Shari`ah pronouncement/resolution shall be issued only through appropriate due processes, 
which, amongst 
others, should involve rigorous deliberation among members of the Shari`ah board over any 
proposed Shari`ah-compliant products or transactions that require a Shari`ah endorsement, 
as well as detailed scrutiny of the legal contracts and other documents relevant to the products 
or transactions. 
(b) Dissemination of information on such Shari`ah pronouncements/resolutions to the 
operative personnel of the IIFS who monitor the day-to-day compliance with the Shari`ah 
pronouncements/resolutions vis-à-vis every level of operations and each transaction Such a 
task would normally be undertaken by a designated “internal Shari`ah compliance 
unit/department (ISCU)”, or at least a Shari`ah compliance officer who is part of the IIFS’s 
compliance team. The IIFS shall equip the ISCU with the appropriate compliance-monitoring 
skills and relevant knowledge of the Shari`ah – for example, by assembling a team of staff 
with the two different skill-sets. The IIFS should also ensure that the ISCU is separate and 
independent from the business units and departments. 
(c) An internal Shari`ah compliance review/audit for verifying that Shari`ah compliance has 
been satisfied,during which any incident of non-compliance will be recorded and reported, 
and as far as possible, addressed and rectified IFSB-3 sets out that Shari`ah pronouncements/ 
resolutions issued by the Shari`ah boards should be strictly adhered to. The internal Shari`ah 
review would therefore be assigned to someone adequately trained in Shari`ah compliance 
review/audit, so that he or she 
would have a competent grasp of the process. 
While the ISCU is part of the IIFS’s compliance team,the internal Shari`ah review/audit 
unit/department (ISRU) may be established to function in a similar manner to the IIFS’s 
internal audit team. The major 
difference is that while the internal auditor will usually report to the Audit Committee, the 
ISRU shall report to the Shari`ah board. 
Where appropriate, the internal Shari`ah review/audit reports shall require or recommend the 
management of the IIFS to address and rectify any issues of Shari`ah compliance. 
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(d) An annual Shari`ah compliance review/audit for verifying that the internal Shari`ah 
compliance review/audit has been appropriately carried out and its findings have been duly 
noted by the Shari`ah board The Shari`ah board who issued the Shari`ah 
pronouncements/resolutions can take charge of this process, having received feedback and 
reports from the ISRU. Alternatively, this task may be assigned to an appropriately competent 
external auditor or external Shari`ah firm. 
The Shari`ah board or Shari`ah advisory firm that carries out the Shari`ah compliance 
review/audit shall produce reports, indicating whether the IIFS has complied with Shari`ah 
requirements throughout the financial year. 
Where appropriate and if deemed necessary, there could be two sets of reports produced: a 
general statement of compliance that should be included in the annual report of the IIFS; and 
a more detailed account of 
compliance work undertaken addressed specifically to 
the supervisory authorities. 
 
E.  shari‘a  Governance Model from Regulatory Perspective 
 
 shari‘a  governance system as defined by The IFSB Guiding Principles on Shariʼah 
Governance System in Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services (IFSB-10) refers to a 
set of institutional and organizational arrangements to oversee  shari‘a  compliance aspects 
in Islamic Financial Institutions (IFIs). In this regard, majority of IFIs have established their 
own  shari‘a  board and some of them even have set up a dedicated internal  shari‘a  review 
unit or department to support  shari‘a  board in performing its function. This indicates a 
positive development on the aspect of  shari‘a  governance system in IFIs. Looking at the 
different framework and style of  shari‘a  governance in various legal environment and 
diverse banking models. 
 
The existing framework of Islamic finance in various jurisdictions demonstrates 
diverse practices and models of  shari‘a  governance system. Some jurisdictions 
prefer greater 
 
involvement of regulatory authorities and some countries on the other hand favor 
otherwise. Until now, it is still debatable whether the former or the latter is more 
prevalent and appropriate for possible adoption. To illustrate these diverse approaches, 
this study identifies five  shari‘a  governance models in the context of regulatory 
perspective. 
 
1. Reactive Approach 
This model is more prevalent in non-Islamic legal environment countries such as 
United Kingdom and Turkey. Although several Islamic banking licenses have been 
issued to IFIs, the regulatory authority is silent upon the  shari‘a  governance 
framework. Like any other conventional banks, IFIs are required to comply with 
existing legislations and regulations. On top of that, IFIs have duty to make sure that 
all their business operation and products are  shari‘a  compliant. There is no specific 
legislation governing IFIs as well as any directive specifying  shari‘a  governance 
framework. At this point, the regulators will only react and intervene the  shari‘a  
governance matters if there is any significance issue involved which may affect the 
industry. For instance, the UK Financial Services Authority only concerns on the roles 
play by the  shari‘a  board of IFIs to be advisory and supervisory and not executive in 
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nature. 
 
2. Passive Approach 
This model is exclusive to  shari‘a  governance model in Saudi Arabia. Saudi 
Authority Monetary Agency (SAMA) treats IFIs equal to their conventional 
counterparts. SAMA has yet to issue legislation pertaining to Islamic finance and 
guidelines on  shari‘a  governance system. There is no national  shari‘a  advisory 
board or any institutions to be the sole authoritative body in Islamic finance. The 
existing  shari‘a  governance system as practiced by IFIs in the Kingdom is a product 
of self initiative rather than regulatory requirement or regulator’s direction. 
 
3. Minimalist Approach 
This model is mainly practiced by the GCC countries with the exception of Oman and 
Saudi Arabia. Unlike the reactive approach, the minimalist model allows slight 
intervention on the part of regulatory authorities. The regulatory authorities expect IFIs 
to have proper  shari‘a  governance system without specifying the requirements in 
details. There is no restriction on multiple appointments of the  shari‘a  board to seat in 
various institutions at one particular time. Some jurisdictions in the GCC countries such 
as Bahrain, Dubai and Qatar favor the adoption of the AAOIFI Governance Standards. 
The minimalist approach prefers the market to develop its own  shari‘a  governance 
system rather than greater intervention on the part of regulators. 
4. Pro-Active Approach 
This model is favorable by Malaysian regulatory authority. The proponent of this model 
has strong faith in regulatory-based approach in strengthening  shari‘a  governance 
framework. With this motivation, Malaysian regulator initiates comprehensive  
shari‘a  governance framework from regulatory and non-regulatory aspects. There are 
several laws were passed and amended by the parliament such as the Islamic Banking 
Act 1983, the Takaful Act 1984, the Banking and Financial Institutions Act 1984 and the 
Securities Commission Act 1993. The Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009 confirms the 
status of National  shari‘a  Advisory Council (SAC) to be the sole authoritative body in 
Islamic finance. Furthermore, the Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) has issued the 
Guidelines on the Governance of  shari‘a  Committee for the Islamic Financial 
Institutions known as the BNM/GPS1. To complement this, the Securities Commission 
of Malaysia issued the Registration of  shari‘a  Advisers Guidelines 2009 which setting 
up the criteria for the registration of a  shari‘a  adviser in the capital market sector. 
 
5. Interventionist Approach. 
While passive approach is exclusive to Saudi Arabia, interventionist model is 
unique to  shari‘a  governance model in Pakistan. The interventionist model allows 
third party institution to make decision on  shari‘a  matters pertaining to Islamic 
finance. In the case of Pakistan, the  shari‘a  Federal Court is the highest authority in 
matters involving Islamic finance despite of the establishment of  shari‘a  board at the 
State Bank of Pakistan level. 
 
 
Shareholders increasingly expect companies to adhere to strict standards of corporate 
governance. In essence, corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed 
and controlled and involves adopting structures and processes which incorporate the values 
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of fairness, transparency and accountability. The practical objective of corporate governance 
is to put in place a system which will deliver a company’s business objectives, i.e. increasing 
shareholder value, whilst managing risk. Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) share the same 
practical and business objectives, but are subject to an additional layer of compliance with 
shari‘a  rules and principles. An IFI does not only seek to make a profit, it seeks to make such 
profit in a socially responsible manner.  
The IFSB has recently released a number of exposure drafts providing ‘Guiding Principles’ 
specifically aimed at Islamic financial institutions. The aim is not thereby to establish an 
entirely new governance framework for the Islamic finance industry, but rather to build on 
and complement existing international standards and encourage institutions to view 
compliance as part of a general strengthening of good corporate governance culture. 
Principles of good business conduct are desirable in terms of protecting investor interests and 
enhancing the integrity of the institutions concerned. It is also a requirement under shari‘a  
that companies observe principles of ethical business conduct. Furthermore, the principles of 
certainty and transparency underpin the validity of a shari‘a  compliant contract. 
Three recent exposure drafts, published in December 2008, offer ‘Guiding Principles’ on 
Conduct of Business for Institutions offering only Islamic Financial Services (Excluding 
Islamic Insurance (Takaful) Institutions and Islamic Mutual Funds) (the Guiding Principles 
on Conduct of Business), shari‘a  Governance System and Governance for Islamic Insurance 
(Takaful) Operations (the exposure drafts). These exposure drafts build on existing corporate 
governance and other IFSB standards. This briefing focuses on the first two. 
The Guiding Principles on Conduct of Business adopt a principles-based rather than a purely 
rules-based approach. It is intended that the seven principles outlined in the exposure draft 
will form the basis of a code of business conduct which is observed by all IFIs, and which 
complements existing standards. 
Principle 1 
Honesty and Fairness - IFIs should treat all shareholders fairly and aspire to the highest 
standards of honesty and integrity in all their dealings with them. 
Principle 2 
Due Care and Diligence - IFIs should exercise due care, skill and diligence in their dealings 
with all categories of investors. An IFI will be expected to carry out proper evaluations of 
risk in relation to any investment activity and undertake appropriate reviews of the process of 
obtaining shari‘a  approval and of the shari‘a  compliance of asset portfolios. 
Principle 3 
Capabilities - an IFI must ensure that its senior management, staff and representatives are 
capable of discharging their duties competently. In particular, it is expected that those parties 
will have an appropriate understanding of shari‘a  and this principle must be continually kept 
under review. 
Principle 4 
Information about Clients - an IFI must undertake “know your customer” checks to ensure 
that an investor’s business and the purpose of any financing are consistent with shari‘a  rules 
and principles. 
Principle 5 
Information to Clients - reporting processes must be transparent and fair. An IFI must protect 
investors and potential investors by providing them with information that appropriately 
reflects the nature of its products and services, and the associated risks. 
Principle 6 
Conflicts of Interest and Duty - as far as possible, an IFI should avoid situations which create 
a conflict of interest. Where this cannot be avoided, the situation should be managed to ensure 
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that all stakeholders are treated fairly and any issues are addressed in a transparent and open 
manner. 
Principle 7 
Shariah Compliance - an IFI must adopt and implement appropriate shari‘a  governance 
systems in order to monitor its shari‘a  compliance. Since shari‘a  compliance is of paramount 
importance in the context of IFIs, this issue is addressed more fully in a separate exposure 
draft as set out below. 
 
Previous IFSB publications highlighted a particular concern over the role and function of 
shari‘a  boards within the Islamic financial services industry. shari‘a  boards play a key role 
in advising institutions on their compliance with shari‘a  rules and principles. Whilst other 
IFSB publications have contained recommendations for ensuring appropriate shari‘a  
governance systems are in place, the Guiding Principles on shari‘a  Governance System were 
a response to the industry’s need for greater clarity in this fundamental area. 
‘Shariah Governance’ is defined as the set of institutional and organisational arrangements 
through which an IFI ensures that there is effective independent supervision of, in particular, 
the issue and dissemination of shari‘a  pronouncements, and internal and external shari‘a  
compliance reviews. 
Principle 1 
General Approach - various different shari‘a  governance structures have been adopted in 
different jurisdictions, and systems adopted should be proportionate to the size, complexity 
and nature of the business. shari‘a  boards should have a clear mandate and be equipped with 
operative procedures and reporting lines to provide effective shari‘a  governance. 
Principle 2 
Competence - the choice of the scholars and other individuals whose role is to provide shari‘a  
advice should be made on the basis of an individual’s honesty, good character and possession 
of the necessary qualifications to understand the technical requirements of the business. The 
need for ongoing professional development of such individuals is also crucial to ensure that 
they are kept up-to-date with legislative changes and industry-specific knowledge. shari‘a  
boards should be regularly assessed in relation to objective performance criteria and be 
accountable to the board of directors. 
Principle 3 
Independence - no individual member of a shari‘a  board should be ‘connected’ with the 
company or serve another function within the company. Each member should be capable of 
exercising independent judgement. The management of the IFI should ensure that all relevant 
information is supplied to the shari‘a  board promptly and in such a manner that enables the 
board to discharge its duties properly. This will involve allowing the shari‘a  board 
independent access to senior management and providing for any further enquiries that may 
be made. 
Principle 4 
Confidentiality - members of the shari‘a  board will inevitably be exposed to commercially 
sensitive inside information in the discharge of their duties. As part of an IFI’s broader risk 
management processes therefore, it should ensure that adequate confidentiality clauses are 
included in each member’s service contract. There should also be an appropriate procedure 
for dealing with leaks of inside information, which may include some form of disciplinary 
action. 
Principle 5 
Consistency - decisions of shari‘a  boards should be consistent and, as far as possible, follow 
the pronouncements of the central shari‘a  authority in the relevant jurisdiction, where 
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applicable. Where no such authority exists, it is recommended that the shari‘a  board uses 
best efforts to conform to any previous rulings and to publish its decisions so that they may 
be openly and transparently assessed. 
The Islamic Financial Services Act 2013 
The rule relating to shari‘a  governance is provided under section 30 until section 36 of IFSA 
2013 whereby the existence of these provisions highlighted the intention of the law maker, in 
focusing to the matters pertaining to appointment and qualification of the shari‘a  Committees 
members in Islamic financial institution. Unlike the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009 
which merely touched the surface of the matter by highlighting the general requirement for 
financial institution to have a shari‘a  committee, the current provision provides a more 
specific requirement under section 30 of IFSA 2013 which requires an institution to apply 
directly to the Central Bank for the establishment of shari‘a  Committee. This will enable the 
Central Bank to have direct information as to the members of the shari‘a  Committee in an 
Islamic financial institution, which at the same time, to ensure a proper supervision towards 
the activities conducted. 
Another major point being made available under the new shari‘a  governance legal provision 
is the criteria of the members of shari‘a  Committee. A clear standard of requirement 
pertaining to the appointment of such committee is highlighted under section 31 which is to 
be crossed referred with section section 29 (2) (a) which states only those who is really fit 
and qualified may be appointed as the shari‘a  
Committee members. This leads to the notion that members of shari‘a  Committees in every 
financial institution must be chaired by those who met the requirements as stated by the 
Central Bank. 
Availability of such clause would be vital in ensuring the products and services introduced 
by the Islamic financial institution complied with the shari‘a  principles via the supervision 
of competent members. 
Section 32 of IFSA 2013 contributes to the significance of shari‘a  Committees in every 
institution through the introduction of the shari‘a  governance which not only set out the duties 
of the shari‘a  committees in the institution, but rather blend into the structure of the company 
itself. By extending the powers of shari‘a  governance into certain aspects in a company such 
as matters involving the board of directors and internal shari‘a  compliance, we can 
understand that shari‘a  governance would 
be one of the integral parts in an institution up to the point that shari‘a  comittee may no longer 
be treated as a minor part or division of a company, what more against the idea of abandoning 
such 
governance rules. 
The introduction of under section 33 and 34 of IFSA, on the other hand, enables the Central 
Bank to continuously be updated by the institution of its shari‘a  Committee members. In 
order to maintain its aim of ensuring that only those who really qualifies entitled to be the 
members, the provision set out the clause relating to the cessation of the members including 
situations which would disqualifies from becoming shari‘a  committee members. 
By setting out a more precise rules and features of the shari‘a  committee members, the IFSA 
2013 under section 35 has made it compulsory for management in charge of the company to 
provide information to the shari‘a  committee in exercising its task and duties. While the Act 
did not mention the type and degree of information required, it can be assumed that the shari‘a  
Committee is authorised to obtain regardless of any kind, if such information would assist 
them in carrying out their duties. 
In addition, section 36 marks the trust which has been given by the legislation over the  shari‘a  
Committee to hold any type of information including the confidential ones provided such 
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information is not being relayed to the other persons. While maintaining the duty of 
confidentiality, the  shari‘a  committees are also vested with the protection under the qualified 
privilege which prevents them from being taken a legal action by the Islamic financial 
institution, if it can be proven that such duties was conducted in good faith. 
The provision clauses as to the  shari‘a  governance is one of the major features being 
introduced under the IFSA 2013 which contributes to the boost of authorities as well as roles 
of the  shari‘a  Committee,thus ensuring the activities of the Islamic financial institution to 
be under  shari‘a  compliance thus maintaining a sound and robust  shari‘a  governance 
framework in Islamic financial industry in Malaysia. 
 
III. EFFECTIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
 
Corporate governance has gained great prominence over the last two decades even in the 
conventional financial system because of continued financial instability. It would be of even 
greater importance in the Islamic system because of the additional risk to which the depositors 
would get exposed when the banks really start moving into the risk-sharing modes. This poses 
an important challenge before Islamic banks to improve all crucial aspects of corporate 
governance. The challenge will become more serious as these institutions expand and their 
problems become more complex. This challenge could be successfully met if the Board of 
Directors and Senior Management become more effective in the performance of their 
responsibilities. 
 
For this purpose, it is important to sharpen the tools of corporate governance, the most 
important of which are: internal controls, risk management, transparency, loan accounting 
and disclosure, shari‘a clearance and audit, external audit, and prudential regulation and 
supervision. Total reliance on these would, however, not be sufficient. Moral commitment on 
the part of all market operators is indispensable. Without such commitment, market operators 
will find different ways of violating the law without getting detected and punished. This will 
create the need for more and more legal checks and controls, which will raise transactions 
costs to an unbearably high level. Making them truly accountable before shareholders and 
depositors by the adoption of measures discussed in this paper should also be of great help. 
What is also needed is the establishment of a number of shared institutions as discussed above. 
Without such institutions even banks with the best corporate governance may not be able to 
avoid crises. 
  
However, corporate governance is generally weak in all countries and particularly so in 
developing countries, in which category nearly all Muslim countries fall at present. This is 
because all the institutions that play a crucial role in disciplining markets and ensuring 
efficiency and integrity are not well-developed in these countries. Information asymmetries 
are more severe, market participants less experienced, and regulations, even if they exist, do 
not always get enforced effectively and impartially because of political corruption and the 
general weakness of judicial systems. Disclosures are also not adequate and accounting 
practices are not well developed. The adverse effects of ineffective corporate governance can 
be more serious in the case of financial institutions because their leverage is much higher, the 
number of their stakeholders is more extensive, and the systemic risks of their failure are far 
more serious. There is no reason to assume that, even though the Islamic financial institutions 
have done fairly well so far, they have necessarily been able to escape the trappings of the 
prevailing weak corporate governance in developing countries. It is, therefore, not possible 
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to avoid the taking of all those measures that would help improve the functioning of these 
institutions. The role of the Board of Directors and Senior Management is of crucial 
importance in this respect. It is gratifying to note that almost all Muslim countries are 
presently in the process of implementing the BCBS guidelines. 
 
A. The Board of Directors 
The Board of Directors cannot, however, play this role effectively if its members do not have 
a high degree of moral integrity as well as professional competence in banking business. They 
must be adequately aware of the risks and complexities involved in the banking business. In 
an Islamic system, they must have the additional qualification of being well-versed in the 
shari‘a and its objectives and in particular the rationale behind the prohibition of interest. 
They should ensure adequate transparency in keeping with the standards laid down by the 
BCBS, the IFSB and the supervisory authority of their own country through a smooth flow 
of relevant information to directors, senior Management, auditors, supervisors, shareholders, 
depositors and the public according to the needs of each with a view to ensure a proper check 
on the affairs of the bank. They must establish a strong internal control system, proper 
accounting procedures, effective internal and external audit, efficient risk management, and 
all necessary checks and balances, rules, regulations and procedures. 
  
Experience has shown that directors do not necessarily perform their roles effectively. There 
are a number of reasons for this.  One of these is that the Board members may not necessarily 
have the professional competence and the moral integrity that are needed to manage the  bank 
efficiently. Another reason is that Board members are not always genuinely elected by 
shareholders and are not necessarily accountable before them. Elections do not take place 
regularly at defined intervals and, even if they do, evidence indicates that shareholders are 
not actively involved in the election or removal of directors.  This enables board members to 
perpetuate themselves and it is generally difficult to dislodge them except through takeovers. 
These are, however, expensive and potentially disruptive and, may not, therefore, be a 
possible remedy except in extreme cases. To correct this situation, it is necessary to have a 
transparent procedure for elections and to adopt measures that would enable minority 
shareholders and investment depositors to have a say in Board decisions. It is also necessary 
to enable shareholders to remove Board members in the event of their performance falling far 
short of what they expect. It is, therefore, imperative to institute reforms in election 
procedures as well as proxy rules to enable shareholders to elect competent and conscientious 
persons to the Board of Directors and to prevent them from perpetuating themselves in spite 
of their poor performance.  
 
It is also necessary to develop a legal and regulatory infrastructure to protect the rights of not 
only minority shareholders but also depositors (both being outsiders). In a number of 
countries companies are allowed to ask registered shareholders, who are unable to attend 
general meetings, to transfer their votes to the Board of Directors. This further strengthens 
the hands of the Board and enables it to control decisions at shareholder meetings. Since the 
transfer of voting rights often leads to far-reaching consequences, which may not always be 
in the interest of all stakeholders, it would be desirable to transfer voting rights to shareholder 
associations, if they exist. If such associations do not exist, then voting rights may be 
transferred to supervisory authorities or to specialized chartered firms established in the 
private sector to protect the interest of stakeholders against a fee as discussed later. All three 
of these institutions would perhaps be better qualified to protect the interests of stakeholders.  
 
40 
 
It would also be helpful if there are an adequate number of non-executive directors on the 
Board. Empirical evidence in the conventional system indicates that non-executive directors 
influence positively a Board’s capabilities to evaluate and discipline managers. This is 
perhaps because such directors do not have any management responsibility and may not, 
therefore, have a vested interest in protecting the management. They may, therefore, be 
expected to attach greater weight to the interests of minority shareholders and depositors and, 
thereby, help inject equity into the company. If they do not come up to this expectation, they 
would hurt their own reputation in the directors’ labour market. Removal of the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) caused by poor performance is more likely in outsider dominated 
Boards than in insider dominated ones. However, here too there are problems. If the non-
executive directors have not been elected by shareholders but rather handpicked by the 
dominant shareholder or the CEO, they would owe their careers to him and would, therefore, 
‘lack the information and incentives required to provide consistent effective corporate 
governance’.  There will, thus, be conflict of interest, which will create a lack of willingness 
on their part to discipline senior management. Moreover, Board meetings may not be frequent 
and non-executive directors may not, therefore, be able to monitor the activities of the 
company effectively and ensure correction, particularly if overt criticism of management 
policies in board meetings is considered to be rude Since Islamic banks are generally small 
compared with their conventional counterparts even in Muslim countries, leave alone the rest 
of the world, the amount of capital held by them is also very small. This enables concentration 
of shares in the hands of a few executive directors. The number of non-executive directors 
who can serve as a check on the executive directors is also accordingly small. Since the small 
size as well as the concentration of shareholdings carries the potential of leading to undesired 
consequences for protecting the interests of all stakeholders, it is desirable to enlarge the size 
of banks and to institute legal reforms with the objective of reducing concentration, 
diversifying risks, and increasing the ability of these banks to absorb losses.  
 
It would also be desirable to introduce some other reforms to make the Board of Directors 
more effective in its functions. One of these, which needs to be considered seriously, is to 
relate the remuneration of Board members to their performance in the same way as required 
in mudaraba contracts.  The directors in their capacity as mudaribs (managing entrepreneurs) 
should be compensated for only their actual expenses and not be entitled to a fixed 
management fee or remuneration as they do in modern corporations. Their remuneration 
should be a certain percent of the profit earned by the bank, if the bank makes a profit. This 
must be in addition to their normal share in profit like other shareholders on the basis of their 
shareholdings. The percentage share of profits to be allocated to the directors for their 
management services must be clearly specified in the Articles of Agreement so that it is well-
known to the shareholders. If the corporation makes a profit, the directors get the specified 
percent of profit for their services. But if the corporation makes a loss, the directors do not, 
like the mudarib, get a ‘fee’ for their management services, and should share in the losses in 
proportion to their stockholdings. The directors would thus get a reward for their services 
only if they have contributed to profits – the higher the profit, the greater their reward. This 
should prove to be an incentive to them for better performance. 
 
B. Senior management 
While the Board of Directors refers to persons who are generally not only shareholders 
themselves but also participate in the governance of the bank, senior management refers to 
the CEO and other senior members of the staff who perform management functions but are 
not necessarily shareholders. Modern corporations are in general not managed by their owners 
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(shareholders). Instead, professional managers are hired to run the business. They are 
‘fiduciaries’.1 This creates the principal/agent problem and leads to a conflict of interests. It 
is, therefore, necessary to impose restrictions on self-dealing, fraud, excessive compensation 
in different hidden forms, and other malpractices. 
 
One of the most important constraints on management is that key positions should not be held 
by one person (‘four eyes principle’). Since the CEO and the Chairman of the Board perform 
two distinct functions in the bank, it would be preferable to have two different persons holding 
these positions so that there is a clear division of responsibilities at the top of the bank to 
ensure independence and balance of power and authority. Neither the directors nor the 
management should be allowed to stay on the job if they are no longer competent or qualified 
to run the bank. As argued by Jensen and Ruback, poor managers who resist being replaced   
might be the costliest manifestation of the agency problem.  
It is the responsibility of the Board of Directors and senior management to ensure proper 
internal controls, and effective management of all risks, including credit risk, liquidity risk, 
interest-rate risk, and operational risks. Even though the exposure of most Islamic banks to 
these risks seems to be relatively high, they have been able to manage them fairly well so far. 
Nevertheless, this may not necessarily continue in the future. It is, therefore, extremely 
important to cultivate an effective risk management culture in these banks to ensure their 
competitiveness and survival in a world full of uncertainties and crises. This cannot, however, 
be done without the active collaboration of Board of Directors, senior management, the 
shari‘a scholars, and bank supervisors. 
C. Regulatory and Internal Frameworks 
 
 
1. Proactive Approach and Integrated Corporate and Sharī'ah Governance 
 
In view of the numerous challenges faced by Islamic finance, it is recommended that the 
industry needs a regulatory-based approach framework as explained before. As a 
prerequisite, Sharī'ah governance must be part of the concerns of regulators and 
policymakers. The regulators should proactively monitor the implementation of Sharī'ah 
governance and learn from the experience of other jurisdictions in nurturing the Sharī'ah 
governance framework. The principle of ‘one-size-fits-all’ Sharī'ah governance is not 
appropriate as the market and local legal environments are different from one place to 
another. 
 
In designing the Sharī'ah governance framework, it is a matter of necessity to 
have an integrated corporate and Sharī'ah governance framework. These two things 
must not be segregated as they complement each other. In this aspect, the principles 
or guidelines on corporate governance must take into account the element of 
Sharī'ah governance when it involves institutions offering Islamic financial 
services. This is important because the stakeholder-oriented model of governance 
in IFIs requires them to protect the rights and interests of all stakeholders. 
 
2. Supervision and Enforcement 
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The regulators should have a comprehensive framework in the aspects of supervision 
and enforcement and these include written guidelines on supervision for 
supervisors, directives for IFIs issued by supervisors, sufficient resources with 
adequate knowledge on Sharī'ah governance-related matters  and full  authority 
to carry out the enforcement functions. The supervisors should provide guidelines 
and make sure that they evaluate the internal policies and procedures as well as the 
implementation of these procedures. It is also important for the supervisors to 
consistently inspect the IFIs by having a proper framework in place which allows 
them to make an assessment of IFIs’ shari‘a governance policies and tools to 
redress any deficiencies. 
 
3. Dispute Settlement 
 
It would be an ideal development if the regulators initiated a special bench for 
Islamic finance cases as part of the court’s structure. In this special bench, the 
court may appoint judges who are knowledgeable in Islamic finance or the 
regulators may allocate a certain amount of funds to provide training for those 
judges. On top of that, a reliable shari‘a  litigation system must also be in place. 
It is understood that in a secular legal environment, such as in the UK, the above 
arrangement is slightly difficult to implement. Therefore, it is important for the 
regulators in the secular legal environment to consider a court referral to a 
s h a r i ‘ a  board or a s h a r i ‘ a  expert to determine cases involving s h a r i ‘ a  
issues. Alternatively, a special tribunal for Islamic finance cases may be 
established to handle disputes involving IFIs in this kind of jurisdiction. 
 
The policymakers should also take into account other legal avenues for dispute 
settlement, such as arbitration and mediation. At this point in time, there are several 
institutions for international dispute resolution, such as the Dubai Centre for Arbitration 
and Conciliation, the GCC Commercial Arbitration Centre, the Bahrain Centre for 
International Commercial Arbitration Centre, the International Chamber of Commerce’s 
International Court of Arbitration, the London Court of International Arbitration, the 
Kuwait Centre for Commercial Arbitration, the Kuala Lumpur Arbitration Centre and 
others. In view of these numerous arbitration centres, it is recommended that there should 
be one specific institution that offers alternative dispute resolutions and settlement for 
Islamic finance cases. Alternatively, the existing arbitration centres should develop and 
enhance their expertise and capabilities in Islamic finance in terms of resources, 
frameworks, procedures and facilities. At this point, these institutions for arbitration must 
prepare to facilitate themselves with necessary facilities and resources to address the need 
for dispute settlement involving Islamic finance cases. 
 
In order to ensure the effectiveness of the arbitration, the decision or solution of the 
arbitration should be made binding and conclusive. The legally binding effect in arbitration 
is crucial for the purpose of ensuring credibility  and confidence in any solution made in 
the arbitration. In spite of that, it is also important for the regulators to encourage arbitration 
as an alternative legal avenue for dispute settlement and to issue policies and procedures 
that clearly acknowledge Islamic law as the main source of law as a basis for decision-
making. 
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4. Well-conceived By-laws and Internal Policies 
 
Well-conceived by-laws and internal policies are prerequisites of effective shari‘a 
governance. Realizing this, the IFIs should have appropriate by-laws and policies as 
guidelines for their internal use in terms of meeting procedures, decision-making, preparing 
reports and dissemination of information, records and reviews. At this point, the IFSB-10 
and the AAOIFI governance standards may be the basis for such by-laws, with some 
modifications that would be appropriate to be implemented within the local market and 
regulatory environment. 
 
D. Attributes of the shari‘a Board on Independence 
 
1. Method of Appointment 
There are significant differences  in the method  of appointment of the shari‘a board between 
IFIs. It is also found that numerous IFIs did not comply with the AAOIFI governance 
standards in that their appointments are made by the BOD and not the shareholders. In view 
of the actual market practice and more practical tools for ensuring independence, There are 
other mechanisms that would be appropriate to achieve such an objective. Firstly, the 
appointment  must  be  made  either  by  the  BOD  or  the  shareholders.  Secondly,  the 
appointment must be subject to the approval of the regulatory authorities. Thirdly, the 
appointment must not be permanent but rather contractual subject to renewal. Fourthly, the 
termination and dismissal must also be subject to the approval of the regulatory authorities. 
 
2. Code of Conduct 
 
The majority of IFIs do not have a code of ethics for shari‘a board. The existing practices 
seem to presume that shari‘a board members are bound by Islamic ethical principles. In view 
of the need to have a certain and precise code of ethics specific and exclusive to the shari‘a 
board, the regulatory authorities as well as the IFIs may prescribe certain acceptable 
behaviour for shari‘a board members. It is incumbent upon the IFIs to initiate and develop an 
internal code of conduct for the shari‘a board. This code of ethics should be enforceable and 
there must be a mechanism within the organizational structure to ensure its strict 
implementation. Breach of this code of ethics may incur disciplinary action such as 
suspension, termination or other kinds of sanctions. 
 
3. Professional Body 
 
There is no professional body specifically established to set a standard practice for the 
shari‘a board as is the case for other professionals such as lawyers, accountants, medical 
practitioners and engineers. The establishment of a professional body to set the 
qualifications of the shari‘a board, to introduce a standard code of conduct, to develop a 
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training programme and to enhance the professionalism of the shari‘a board is consider 
necessary at this point in time. At the moment, different bodies attempt to provide 
qualification programmes for shari‘a boards, such as the AAOIFI Certified shari‘a Adviser 
and Auditor, the Scholar Development Program initiated by the IFC Islamic finance council 
and the SII and the IBFIM shari‘a Scholars Introduction Program, but it was found that such 
qualifications have not been accepted universally. The study strongly recommends the 
establishment of The Association of 
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Sharī'ah Advisors at the national and international levels.235 With this association, the 
quality of the shari‘a board can then also be rated by an independent agency similar to a 
credit-rating agency. 
 
4. Remuneration Policy 
 
There are significant differences in the remuneration of different shari‘a boards. The 
absence of any policy limitation or guidelines on the shari‘a board’s remuneration may 
lead to unhealthy practices. The top ten shari‘a scholars who dominated the board 
positions in IFIs around the world earn a very lucrative and significant amount of 
remuneration. It was found that a chairman of a shari‘a board could earn USD50,000 to 
USD100,000 per board and a top scholar could even gain up to USD250,000 on a typical 
capital markets deal. This study further estimates that the top five shari‘a scholars may 
earn up to a million dollars per year for servicing more than a hundred board and 
chairman positions around the world. While there is no standard benchmark or scale fee 
for  shari‘a advisors, the regulators as well as the IFIs should establish a specific policy 
for the remuneration of shari‘a board members based on the appropriate scale fees. In 
the context of the internal policy of IFIs, the shari‘a board scale fees should be approved 
by the shareholders and disclosed in the annual report. 
 
5. Attributes of the shari‘a Board on Confidentiality 
 
There were shari‘a scholars who have unintentionally or indirectly disclosed some 
confidential information, particularly those sitting on  the boards of numerous IFIs. In 
addition, the survey results indicated that 29% of IFIs view that the shari‘a board is not 
fully aware of the issue of confidentiality. Realizing this, the IFIs should have a proper 
mechanism to resolve this issue and this includes terms of reference in the letter of 
appointment, enforcement of the code of ethics and disciplinary proceedings for any 
misconduct by the shari‘a board. In defining the scope of confidentiality, a reference 
may be made to section 52 of the IFSB-10. The IFSB-10 nevertheless does not provide 
guidelines for disciplinary proceedings in the event that shari‘a board members breach 
confidentiality or disclose sensitive or confidential information. As such, the IFIs are 
recommended to have proper disciplinary proceedings, such as hearing procedures, and 
rules of evidence with an appropriate organizational structure. 
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Table 1 
Key Players in Corporate Governance (CG) of Islamic 
Financial Institutions (IFIs) 
 
Environment Important Issues Objectives/ Responsibilities in CG 
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Government 
(Laws and Regulations 
for IFIs) 
Laws facilitating 
operations of Islamic 
financial institutions 
Provide clear laws and 
regulations that cater to the 
needs of IFIs. 
Accounting System Accounting and Audit 
standards for clear and 
transparent communication 
of information 
Provide uniform, clear 
and transparent 
accounting standards 
Public Institutions   
Supervisors Stability and soundness of 
the financial system 
(eliminate systemic risk) 
Develop internal controls, 
risk management 
procedures, and standards 
f t  
Provide Guidelines for FIs 
Monitor overall operations 
in general and risky 
behavior in particular 
Banking Associations Provide minimum standards 
of CG 
Set Principles and Sound 
practices 
Institutional   
Shareholders Shareholder Rights Elect board members 
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 Share in profit  
Board of Directors Ensure good management 
team 
Oversight of management 
Protect shareholders and 
investment depositors rights 
Set overall policy 
and strategy 
Accountability of 
the management 
Senior Management Operate the institution 
efficiently. 
Right balance between risk 
and return 
Efficient incentive-structure 
Implement the policies set 
by the board in a sound and 
responsible manner 
Internal Audit Quality and quantity 
of information 
Transparency of information 
Ensure that the policies set 
by Board are followed by 
the management 
 Employees Skills and work ethics 
Right incentive-
structure 
Meet the goals set by the 
management 
Minimize operational risks 
Sharī‘ah Boards Set shari‘a related rules 
and principles 
Oversee compliance with its 
verdict 
Others   
Depositors Good service 
Comparable returns 
Act responsibly 
Monitor the performance 
External Auditors Quality and quantity 
of information 
Transparency of information 
Evaluate the accuracy of the 
quality and quantity of 
information 
Sharī‘ah  Audit Adherence to the Sharī‘ah Ensure compliance with the 
Sharī‘ah Board verdicts. 
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Figure 3:  Key Players in Corporate Governance of Islamic Financial Institutions 
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